How to Break a Terrorist

The most important part of this book to me was the description of the origin of the conflict between Shia and Sunnis. It comes in a quoted passage of the author being questioned to determine his qualifications to be on an Iraqi terrorist interrogation team. When asked to explain the difference between Shia and Sunni, he replied, “That’s an easy one. It goes back to the schism in Islam caused by the death of Muhammad. Sunnis believe that the legitimate successor was Muhammad’s closest disciple, Abu Bakr. Shi believe the succession should have passed through his cousin Ali, who was also his daughter Fatima’s husband. The Shia lost, and Abu Bakr retained leadership until he died…and the Sunnis have held the balance of power ever since.” Sunnis held power under Saddam Hussein in the dominantly Shiite country of Iraq.

The book describes how an American interrogation team was searching for Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who established a terrorist organization called Tawhid al Jihad, and established strong ties with the Sunnis after Saddam was taken out of power. The book is listed as being authored by Matthew Alexander, but the author’s note states that it was written under a pseudonym and passages are blacked out, as by a censor.

The wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal changed everything in the interrogation techniques to “more civilized interrogation techniques.” The Foreword by Mark Bowden states that the question of limits to interrogation techniques “…had become predictably politically charged and highly controversial, with liberals viewing harsher tactics as a sign of more and legal degeneration, and conservatives regarding attitude toward coercion as a litmus test of one’s seriousness about the war on ‘terror’.” The “more civilized techniques” included getting to know the subject “…and then manipulating him by role-playing, flattering, misleading, and nudging his or her perception of truth slightly off center.” It seemed to me that “misleading” was the most important aspect, since lying to the prisoner was the most frequent part of the process.

Iraq was described as “a laboratory experiment. The U.S. military came in, shattered the civil order…and unleashed chaos…As a result; Baghdad …is a playground for opportunists, thieves, murderers, and fanatics. Caught in the middle are plenty of good people…” There are several references to how Iran was (is) supplying training and equipment to the terrorists. One prisoner remarks, “They arm the Shia against us. The death squads. The militias.” Many Sunni felt they had no choice but to accept Al Qaida. “Few of them espouse the Al Qaida ideology or believe in it.”

The interrogators called themselves ‘gators, and told the joke, “What’s the difference between a ‘gator and a car salesman? Answer: A ‘gator has to abide by the Geneva Convention.” The book says water boarding is prohibited by the Geneva Convention. (The Geneva Convention applies to soldiers captured while fighting under uniform for a sovereign government. It does not apply to terrorists.)

Many of the captives deny being members of Al Qaeda, but one named Zaydan freely admits he worked to recruit Sunni fighters through mosques. It is explained that many of the recruits joined to gain safety from roving Shia death squads. The suicide bombers were described as all being from other countries. The “foreigners” were often from Saudi Arabia. The bombers were blowing themselves up in crowded market places with no regard for the citizens gathered to do business there, and in 2006 Iraq was described as spiraling out of control.

Several interrogations are described in the book, and the path to Zarqawi if finally revealed by a prisoner named Abu Haydar. He describes himself as being a Harry Potter fan. He is identified as a senior member of Al Qaida, and he is told that he has been identified for a “special program.” It is explained that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. bases in Central Asia were designed to prepare for a war with Iran. The story continues that the U.S. is seeking “…Sunni leaders willing to fight with us against the Shia and Iran.” He is then told that he must prove his reliability and willingness to join by giving up something of value. Abu Haydar responds by naming the person who is Zarqawi’s number two man. He then also reveals a man named Al Rahman is Zarqawi’s personal spiritual advisor, and that he changes from a white to a blue car if he is going to see Zarqawi. Surveillance picks up the described switch and follows the blue car to a farmhouse. Two F-16s drop 500-pound laser guided bombs on the house. Two Iraqis are caught by and American combat team carrying Zarqawi out of the rubble, and he is still alive. The bomb blast has collapsed his lungs, he is bleeding heavily out of his mouth, and he dies almost immediately.

I wondered about the legitimacy of the accounts in the book, and I also noted a lack of editing consistency. For example, the front flap refers to “Al Qaeda,” but in other places it is spelled “Al Qaida.” Both spellings are used, but it seemed odd to use two different spellings.

Regardless of how the organization should be spelled, the descriptions of torture and beheadings committed by the terrorists are graphic. The prisoners being interrogated by the Americans were terrified of what would happen if they talked and were retaken by the terrorists. They had no fear of what the Americans would do, which is why the interrogations described seldom led to any useful information. Abu Haydar was successfully tricked to believe he was being recruited as a senior Sunni leader for a planned war against Shia Iran. That trick led to the successful completion of the interrogation team’s mission.