Hiroshima

Hiroshima book coverI’ve been told this book by John Hershey is the most famous of the many books describing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. My first reaction was to be astonished that it was so small. I won’t be so foolish to dismiss the importance of a book that has over 400 Amazon reviews with an average of more than 4 out of five “stars,” but I expected more. Perhaps I’ve read too many books that describe the horrific effects of a nuclear weapon detonation over a city. My purpose for finally reading it was to look for new information for the book I’m writing that has the working title of “Nuclear Deterrence: An Early History of The Rocky Flats Plant.” That history obviously includes the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Any history of the impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence would obviously be deficient without a discussion of the first use of nuclear weapons in war.

The book describes the situations of six residents of Hiroshima when the nuclear bomb was detonated over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The six are described as a clerk who was chatting with a coworker, a physician who had sat down to read a newspaper, a tailor’s widow who was watching a neighbor, a German priest who was reading a magazine, a surgeon who was carrying a blood sample to a laboratory, and a Methodist pastor who was unloading a cart of clothes. The first observation is that they all had, for one reason or another, turned their heads away from the location of the detonation or were a few feet beyond a window that faced the detonation. Those small accidents of history saved all of them from having their eyes destroyed. There is a description of how a contingent of Japanese soldiers was outside and all had looked up to see the single B-29 when the detonation occurred. All of them had their “eyes melted.” Continue reading

Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government

atomic-energy-for-military-purposesThis report, written by Henry DeWolf Smyth at the request of Major General L.R. Groves (who led the Manhattan Project), is better known the “Smyth Report.” The copyright announcement by Smyth is interesting. “Reproduction in whole or in part authorized and permitted.” Groves wrote in the Foreword that “…there is no reason why the administrative history of the Atomic Bomb Project and the basic scientific knowledge on which the several developments were based should not be available to the general public.” There also are blunt warnings against requesting or releasing additional information “…subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.” Smyth explains in the Preface that “The ultimate responsibility for our nation’s policy rests on its citizens and they can discharge such responsibilities wisely only if they are informed.” He explains that the report is written about the construction of atomic bombs for “…engineers and scientific men who can understand such things and who can explain the potentialities of atomic bombs to their fellow citizens.” The book gives a tutorial on the history of research on atomic structure and radioactivity and the basics of nuclear physics.

The administrative history of the research has been well-documented in many sources, but many of them probably used the information in this book. One issue that was considered in depth early on was the need for secrecy about the research that was being considered or was on-going.  A “Reference Committee” was established in the National Research Council “…to control publication policy in all fields of possible military interest.” Journal editors would send copies of papers to the committee for review. The system worked well. Most physicists were soon absorbed into the various projects, “…which reduced papers being submitted to the committee almost to the vanishing point.” The arrangement was voluntary, but scientists in the country cooperated.  Scientists in Germany, the Soviet Union, and other countries recognized that the United States was attempting to develop atomic energy for a weapon based on the sudden absence of research papers being published by scientists in the U.S.

One piece of information that disagrees with many other sources is that Harry Truman was well aware of the project and its magnitude when he was a Senator. He was briefed by Stimson and Groves on the project immediately after FDR’s death and his inauguration, and he kept “…in constant touch with the program.” Continue reading

US Nuclear Weapons: A Secret History

us-nuclear-weapons-secret-historyThis book by Chuck Hansen is an encyclopedia of nuclear weapons, and I recommend it as such to anyone who would be interested in reading about that. The book is listed at $144 on Amazon, so I recommend trying the interlibrary loan system before you commit to a purchase. It had less information about the subjects in which I have as an interest, and the short review to follow is a reflection of that. It has great pictures of various nuclear blasts as well as pictures of various weapon bodies and various delivery systems. Hansen’s feelings about nuclear weapons are not subdued. He describes in the introduction that “…a vast empire has arisen largely unnoticed in the United States.” “The secret empire has cost taxpayers dearly: $89 billion in development costs since 1940, and $700 billion for delivery systems for its products. The sheer volume and number of these products is mind-boggling: between 1945 and 1986, the nuclear weapons complex in the U.S. manufactured approximately 60,000 warheads of 71 types for 116 different weapons systems.” “The U.S. government has always gone to extreme lengths to keep this orgy of nuclear self-indulgence hidden from public view.” There is a reference that “…tens of millions of documents chronicling this vast ‘black project’ remain locked away in vaults…” (It makes one wonder how the author was able to find anything to write about.)

Ironically, a discussion follows of how it had been thought the U.S. would maintain a nuclear monopoly much longer than what occurred. The Soviets were able to steal everything they needed by espionage to develop atomic bombs while bypassing the need to invent and test the design information developed by the U.S. Continue reading

The Road to Trinity

road-to-trinityThis book, which had the subtitle, “A Personal Account of How America’s Nuclear Policies Were Made, was written by Major General Kenneth D. Nichols, (Retired). Nichols was a Lieutenant Colonel when he began an assignment as deputy district engineer of the Manhattan Engineer District. He was deputy to Leslie Groves. There have been many books written on the subject, but I would recommend this and the Groves account “Now it Can be Told,” as the best two to read if you are just beginning to want to understand what happened in the Manhattan Project and beyond. I was shocked that there hasn’t been a single review of the Nichols book on Amazon. You can buy a used copy of the book for about a dollar plus shipping. It would be worth your investment, although interlibrary loan was even less expensive.

The book begins in November 1952 when Nichols is directed to write his “…personal views on the political and military implications of the hydrogen bomb and given three hours to write it.” He wrote that the hydrogen bomb “…has equal or greater political than strictly military implications.” He warned that to achieve deterrence the U.S. must convince the Soviet Union we will utilize nuclear weapons ruthlessly. He believed we should have used tactical nuclear weapons in Korea “…proving to the world we really mean to use every potential weapon available to us to preserve peace and thereby deter war. He recognized that might or probably would  have precipitated a major war “…at a time when we have the greatest potential for winning it with minimum damage to the U.S.A.”

People who are “anti-nuclear” and favor disarmament will gasp at some of the things Nichols writes. I was comfortable with his advice and opinions, and judge that he had, because of the roles he filled, an informed understanding of the real world situation that should be carefully and respectfully considered despite which side of the argument you might stand on. Continue reading

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate

spread-of-nuclear-weaponsThis book written by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz is interesting because the two authors, as is indicated by the title, take radically different positions on the threat from the spread of nuclear weapons. I’ll let the authors explain further from the Preface. “What are the likely consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons? The answer is by no means certain or simple. Indeed, the readers will discover we disagree about the central issue. Kenneth Walsh argues that the fear of the spread of nuclear weapons is exaggerated: ‘More may be better’ since new nuclear states will use their weapons to deter other countries from attacking them. Scott Sagan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons will make the world less stable. ‘More will be worse’ since some new nuclear states will engage in preventive wars, fail to build survivable forces, or have serious nuclear weapons accidents.” That’s a good summary of what they say in the book, although I didn’t find out what the “fail to build survivable forces” has to do with the debate.

Kenneth Walsh takes the lead with his proposal that “More May be Better.” He points out that the world had “…enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in modern history, if peace is defined as the absence of general war among the major states of the world.” He argues that, “War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains.” The incentive for the major nuclear powers to begin an exchange makes it clear to even the most insane leader that there will be little to gain since each side has sufficient nuclear stockpiles to destroy the other. That easy to understand fact has prevented World War III for seventy years while there have been nuclear weapon stockpiles in the many tens of thousands of weapons. “Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish.” Walsh writes, “Early in the Cold War, the United States deterred the Soviet Union, and in due course, the Soviet Union deterred the United States.” He observes that he believes “The presence of nuclear weapons makes war less likely…Nuclear weapons have not been fired in anger in a world in which more than one country has them.” Continue reading

Now it Can be Told

now-it-can-be-toldThis book was written, as stated on the cover page, By Leslie R. Groves, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired. I’ve read several books about the Manhattan Project, and I would put this on at the top of the list to someone who has just developed an interest in the subject. It describes in no uncertain terms the complexity and difficulty of what was being sought and the remarkable achievements that resulted. To General Groves’ credit, he dedicates the book, “To the men and women of the Manhattan Project, and to all those who aided them in their yet unparalleled accomplishment.” I was impressed by the number of times Groves wrote about something going wrong because of something he had done. He shied away from blaming others for problems and gave credit to those who suggested some insight or approach that he had not considered.  My “personal review” of the book that I prepared for use in a new book I’m researching about the history of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant covers twenty-three pages. I promise to impose a much shorter version in this review.

Groves was in charge constructing the Pentagon when he was told he had been selected by the Secretary of War for an important project, and that his selection had been approved by President Roosevelt. I was surprised that Groves knew about what he called “…the atomic development program…,” and responded unenthusiastically, “Oh, that thing.” He met with his commanding General who told him, “The basic research and development are done. You just have to take the rough designs, put them in final shape, build some plants and organize an operating force and your job will be finished and the war will be over.” Groves admits in his book that it took weeks before he had a comprehension of, “…how overoptimistic an outlook he had presented.”

Groves describes the research by physicists that led some to conclude an atomic bomb was possible. Lise Meitner explained to Otto Hahn that the results of his research in Germany indicated the uranium atom could be split and that the resulting fission (a term developed by Meitner and her nephew) would release enormous amounts of energy. The genesis of the Manhattan Project was initiated by scientists Hitler drove out of Germany. Many came to America, and they feared what would happen if the Germans were the first to develop the bomb. One of the problems they faced was that the “…American-born scientists, in the main, did not have so acute and appreciation of the danger…” The process that resulted in Franklin Roosevelt approving research is described in numerous sources, but the Groves account is, in my estimation, adequately complete and to the point. Continue reading