Supporters of Muammar Gaddafi continue to resist rebel forces in two cities as I type this. There have been concerns about the fate of chemical weapons stores in Libya, but the world can celebrate that Gaddafi was convinced to give up development of nuclear weapons in 2003.
An article on Globalsecurity.org w discusses that Libya wanted to develop nuclear weapons to counteract the weapons believed to be held by Israel. They were willing to work with any country to obtain the training and equipment necessary to operate a nuclear weapons development program. Argentina sent geologists to Libya to teach methods of uranium prospecting and processing, and the Libyans obtained uranium “yellow cake” from Niger in 1978. India agreed to work with them in development of peaceful nuclear technology, and France agreed to build a nuclear research facility to power a water desalination plant. There were inquiries for nuclear weapons technology to China, North Korea, and Pakistan. The Soviet Union helped staff a nuclear research facility outside of Tripoli, and at one time planned to build a small reactor for the Libyans. The Japanese provided them the technology necessary to operate uranium processing facilities.
U.S. intelligence had warned that Libya would have deployable nuclear weapons by 2007, but according to the article previously mentioned there were secret talks between Libya, the United States, and Great Britain after that warning. Gaddafi requested the talks immediately after the invasion of Iraq (Wikipedia reference) by 148,000 American, 45.000 British, 2000 Australian, and 194 Polish soldiers. George Bush and Tony Blair announced the invasion was to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people. It is common knowledge that weapons of mass destruction were not found (see the posting dated December 31, 2010 titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass destruction).
Libya continued with efforts to obtain processing equipment despite the talks. In October 2003 a U.S.-led naval operation under the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative intercepted a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. That operation apparently convinced the Libyans they could not continue with plans for development of nuclear weapons and it was announced on December 19, 2003 that they had agreed to destroy all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The agreement provided that Libya’s facilities could be inspected, and one official stated the opinion they were much further along in their development than had been previously thought. Twenty-five tons of equipment and uranium were removed and delivered to the United States. The New York Times reported there were 4,000 centrifuges of Pakistani design that might have been manufactured in Malaysia in the material shipped to the United States. Documents recovered during inspections included design information for a Chinese nuclear weapon. There was also information that as much as $100 million dollars had been paid by Libya to Pakistani scientists for information and equipment.
Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was instrumental in the international illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. He was involved in development of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capability, and he established a network of scientists, suppliers, and front companies that provided Libya, North Korea, and Iran nuclear weapons technology and equipment. Michael Laufer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace developed a chronology of Khan’s activities. Khan had acquired the blueprints for a Chinese bomb by the early 1980s. It was reported that he was approached by “…an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance.” Iran obtained centrifuges from Pakistan that were no longer needed by that country in 1989. Shipments of centrifuges to Libya began in 1997 and continued until they ended their programs in 2003.
There is no doubt Muammar Gaddafi had committed to arm himself with nuclear weapons. I did not agree with the decision to invade Iraq, and there have been many negative consequences of that invasion. However, there was one important positive achieved by that invasion. Gaddafi began negotiations with the U.S. and Britain on weapons of mass destruction immediately after coalition forces entered Iraq. The interception of centrifuges and other equipment by the U.S. Navy a few months later pushed him to end his programs and ship the equipment to the United States. It is frightening to think what might have been if Gaddafi had nuclear weapons when the rebels began to take over Libya.
The subtitle of this book is “The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb.” The book was annotated by Robert Serber and edited with an introduction by Richard Rhodes. It is a fascinating book that would take a long time to fully digest despite its length (only 98 pages including Appendices, Biographical Notes, and an index. The Biographical Notes includes many of the “famous scientists of the times,” but not Robert Serber. I enjoyed the book because it wove the very complicated scientific developments with refreshing non-technical descriptions and comments that made me feel less intimidated about the brilliance of what was being described. The descriptions were often “clipped,” which means it didn’t always flow as well as what you would expect from a literature major. Perhaps that is because the author was a physicist. Some of my favorite passages involve Charlotte Serber (who also is sadly not listed in the index), Robert Serber’s wife. For example, she is described as being the librarian for the project before there were books. I thought about buying a copy for each of our grandsons who are interested in science. However, I admit that I was a bit intimidated by the $40-$60 price for the used books. I suggest you request your local library to borrow it from a local university, which is what I did.