Making a Real Killing—Operations, Legal Actions, and Controversies

This is the second half of my review about the book by Len Ackland. The first half was about the history of homesteading and development of the area that included Rocky Flats by the Church family beginning in 1861 and the selection of part of their land for the construction of a new nuclear weapons production plant. This part of the review will briefly summarize what was written about early years of operation when the plant was more or less considered “invisible” to neighbors and the later years when accidents and incidents led to a precipitous decline in the reputation of the place.  I wrote that I would restrict myself to doing a non-editorializing review, and I succeeded at that in the first half of my review of the book. I disagree with some of what is mentioned in this half, and I intend to post a blog discussing those items. An asterisk indicates that you can read a differing view on the blog site. I suggest reading that blog and my book “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths Debunked to get another perspective about Rocky Flats.

The first building constructed on the Rocky Flats site, was named “Building D”, and would eventually be called Building 991. The book calls it “…the atomic bomb assembly building.”* In those early days everyone working at the plant had to have a “Q clearance” issued after background investigations by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Building 771 was constructed later to allow a multitude of operations including the ability to process solutions containing plutonium, and it would be the location of the first major accident in 1957 resulting in an uncontrolled release of plutonium. A fire breached the filter plenums in the exhaust system until fire fighters brought it under control with water. The workers (there were about 2000 at the time) were concerned that the facility would not be brought back on line, and that their jobs would be lost. However, resources were dedicated to decontamination and repair, and the building was brought back into production. Not surprisingly, the fire created an increase in focus on safety. However, there was little outside attention given to the accident, in part because the official accident report issued by the AEC called it a “serious accident,” but didn’t name Rocky Flats. The accident had occurred within the memory of the harsh Soviet suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, which “…confirmed the regime’s brutality…” “Most Americans, including the managers and employees at Rocky Flats, accepted the notion that the United States had to win the nuclear arms race in order to defeat communism.”

Rocky Flats was efficient at building plutonium components, but waste shipment and treatment couldn’t keep up. Drums of solid waste and some liquid wastes were buried in trenches, “the mound,” and in other areas (those areas would eventually be remediated). Liquid wastes were a different story. The biggest problem was oils mixed with carbon tetrachloride that had been used to machine plutonium. Beginning in 1958 several liquid wastes, including the contaminated oil/carbon tetrachloride mixture were put into drums and stored on a dirt area called the “903 pad.”The drums corroded and began to leak, large scale deterioration was reported in 1964, and the drums began to be removed for processing. The 903 pad was emptied by June 1968 and the pad was graded. “Then, reflecting the same nonchalant approach to nuclear waste that led plant managers to create this temporary storage area in the first place, the field sat uncovered and subject to wind dispersion until July 1969…”*

Worker safety in the plutonium processing areas was impacted by the presence of plutonium 241, and one “daughter” americium 241 as a decay product. Both emitted penetrating radiation that caused increases in radiation exposures to workers. Also, in 1967 the plant began making nuclear fuel elements for a “Zero Power Plutonium Reactor” (ZPPR), which vaporized Americium and increased worker exposure to radiation. Over a million pounds of Benelex was added to the glove box lines in Building 776/777 to protect workers from neutrons.* The Mother’s Day 1969 fire began with spontaneous combustion of plutonium and the fire spread through the Plexiglas windows and glove ports to the Benelex which burned and created dense smoke.

Fire fighters quickly realized they had to use water to extinguish the fire despite the risk of a criticality. Their heroic action saved the building, and prevented a massive uncontrolled release of plutonium despite the fact that the heat from the blaze had made a section of the roof “soft.” Once again the workers, 3,216 at this time (including me) believed that the facility had to be decontaminated and brought back on line for national security reasons and to save their jobs.  The author writes that, “Investigators concluded that no contamination had gone off-site. Later studies found that “…little or no contamination was dispersed.” Local scientists found plutonium in samples collected around Rocky Flats after hearing of the fire and challenged the official announcements that there had been no release. The official response was that the contamination came from the 1957 fire and the 903 pad area. That naturally led to questions such as “What 1957 fire and what pad area?” Peace and environmental activists found footing for a rapid increase in protests and initiatives to shut the plant down. (I attribute the previous silence from the plant about those releases to the accusation that continues today that the plant “operated under a veil of secrecy.”) The AEC conducted nuclear detonations at Rulison and Rio Blanco in the same time frame as the information about the fire became known. The blasts added to public concerns. Colorado voters approved a 1974 ballot imitative to halt “peaceful” nuclear blasts in the state.*

The State of Colorado reported elevated levels of tritium in surface water below Rocky Flats in April 1973. “Dow and AEC officials assured the health department that the plant possessed no tritium source that could account for the contamination.” The tritium contamination was confirmed by the EPA in September, “Although the Colorado Department of Health… determined the tritium posed no health threat, the episode further damaged the plant’s reputation.” A plant employee was quoted as saying, “I spoke out because I knew what was wrong. I knew Dow was lying…” * The State of Colorado appointed the “Lamm-Wirth Task Force on Rocky Flats,” and the final report recommended “…phasing out the Rocky Flats plant’s nuclear weapons-manufacturing operations and converting the facility to a ‘less hazardous’ energy industry…” The report hedged on saying the plant should be shut down, because they didn’t want the state to lose jobs. “In evaluating these alternatives, strong consideration should be given to maintaining the economic integrity of the Plant, its employees, and the surrounding communities.”

The movement arguing against Rocky grew markedly in strength after the revelations about plutonium contamination, the underground nuclear blasts, and the tritium incident. The book gives significant details about the various people, organizations, and events involved in protesting the plant. I give the author credit for also mentioning that there was a counter protest movement strongly supported by Rocky Flats workers. In August 1979 “…an estimated 16,000 people attended a support rally outside Rocky Flats.” *

Regulatory problems began with the passage in 1976 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Department of Energy contended that the Atomic Energy Act exempted their facilities from RCRA. An environmental group won a lawsuit that ruled RCRA applied to the Oak Ridge plant in Tennessee. DOE accepted that ruling, but contented “mixed” hazardous and radioactive waste continued to be exempt, which set the initial stage for the FBI raid of Rocky Flats. More attention was attracted when a DOE official wrote a memo in 1986 that described Rocky Flats as being “…in poor condition generally in the terms of environmental compliance.”  Whistleblowers added to the files of investigators, and then the manger of the DOE office that oversaw Rocky Flats sent a memo to “…send a message to EPA and DOE and its management contractors are willing to ‘go to the mat’ to oppose the cleanup of Rocky Flats and other nuclear weapons facilities.” All of this resulted in a search warrant to raid Rocky Flats and the raid began June 6, 1989 under the watchful eye of a reporter and photographer who had been tipped off about the raid. DOE fired Rockwell. However, Representative David Skaggs and Governor Roy Romer announced that there had been no “midnight burning” of hazardous waste in Building 771 that had been a key allegation in the search warrant shortly after Energy Secretary James Watson “temporarily” suspended plutonium operations.

A grand jury was impaneled in August 1989 to investigate the allegations about Rocky Flats and met every month for a week for two and a half years to hear from 110 witnesses and examine 760 boxes of documents. The grand jury wanted Rockwell and DOE official tried, and were sufficiently incensed at the plea bargain settlement that they wrote their own report. Someone released to the report to a local newspaper. The book concludes “Investigators failed to prove the most spectacular crimes alleged in the June 1989 search warrant.” There is a further statement that “Prosecutors apparently disagreed among themselves over whether or not individuals should be charged.” Rockwell pled guilty to ten crimes, but DOE was excluded from blame. “While the investigation showed that DOE did not endorse the particular criminal conduct to which Rockwell has pled guilty, a prevailing DOE ‘culture’ allowed Rocky Flats’ crimes to occur” *

The plant went through major changes brought on by the FBI raid, grand jury investigation, plea bargain, and the public attitude toward the plant. DOE changed the name, management structure, and contractor. There are discussions of the arguments on “how clean is clean” in the efforts to decontaminate facilities before demolition and whether DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico could be opened to accept waste from Rocky Flats and other sites (it was). It was announced that Rocky Flats would be drummed up and sent elsewhere by 2006. Many in the audience were skeptical (but the site was declared closed by the end of 2005).

The Epilogue mentions Charlie McKay’s real estate aspirations and the report issued after the State of Colorado hired Radiological Assessments Corporation investigated the plant’s routine operations, incidents, and accidents. The corporation announced, “They haven’t found significant off-site contamination.” The man who gave a presentation at a Denver hotel was accused to being “intellectually dishonest.”