Part one of the review about the book “Blacklisted by History” by M. Stanton Evans gives the background for Joe McCarthy’s original accusations about the infiltration of communist agents in the U.S. Government in general and the State Department in particular and the early attempts to discredit him and his accusations. This part will focus on the friction between those concerned about Soviet spying, including Joe, and reactions of other politicians, including the Presidents.
I’ve read several books that make it clear that Franklin Delano Roosevelt never wanted to hear negative things about the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin. He had paved the way to provide diplomatic immunity to the Soviets. He didn’t want to hear that action had opened a broad pathway for the Soviets to establish a massive espionage network in the United States that sent its tentacles into just about every aspect of government and the military. Roosevelt made a rude remark to Adolph Berle when Berle tried to brief FDR about a Soviet espionage ring revealed by Whitaker Chambers. The author summarizes in biting terms the Roosevelt administration’s mood “…during the ‘gallant allay’ daze of wartime, when FDR, Harry Hopkins, and their minions were lauding Stalin, letting Earl Browder out of prison, and strewing roses along the path that led comrades to the federal payroll.”
Truman, I had always thought, took a much less conciliatory tone toward Stalin and the Soviets. I also had read that the generals who had control of who would be briefed about the magnitude of Soviet espionage as learned by the Venona project decided that Truman would not be given that information. The FBI is often blamed for the failure to identify and prevent Soviet penetration, and that blame often includes the allegation that that agency withheld information from Truman. However, the author observes that “…all of this is moonshine and will be so perceived by anyone who bothers to check the official records. As has been seen, the FBI was neither fooled by nor indifferent to Soviet penetration efforts in the 1940s…Nor did the Bureau withhold its knowledge of such matters from the Truman White house.” The author offers the opinion, “That he (Truman) was a visceral anti-Communist is not in doubt. However, he did seem to know little about the way the Soviets and their U.S. agents functioned, or their presence in the government he headed, and didn’t show much interest in learning.”
J. Edgar Hoover even went outside official channels to get information to Truman by passing information to George Allen, who was a well-known friend of the President. Hoover also immediately went to General Harry Vaughan, Truman’s aide, when Elizabeth Bentley turned and gave the FBI details of a Soviet espionage ring. He provided a report that included eleven named Soviet spies in various high levels of the U.S. government, including Laughlin Currie who had been the Administrative Assistant to FDR and Harry Dexter White who was Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury. Several follow-up reports were provided. Perhaps the reason Truman did not react to the reports was that General Vaughan was seen throwing one of the reports in the wastebasket.
Truman did react to growing public criticism of failures to find and expel Soviet sympathizers and spies by implementing a loyalty program by executive order. All federal employees were required to sign a loyalty oath, and those under suspicion were investigated. Over three hundred people were expelled because of security concerns. Joe McCarthy tried to get the security files turned over for examination by a Senate committee, but the Truman administration refused to allow that. The State Department expressed a willingness to provide the files, but the files were then transferred to the White House. State Department employee Donald Nicholson told the FBI “…the files were transferred to the White House is for political reasons, and further, for the reason that the State Department was fearful that the Secretary of State would be served with a subpoena to produce the files, which can now be answered by stating the files were not in the possession of the State Department.”
Senator Millard Tydings who led investigation of Joe in Senate hearings participated in the protection of the files from examination. He announced, “I have been advised by FBI agents that the material gathered by the FBI touching on the loyalty of the employees in question has been sent to State Department and are (sic) part of the files our committee examined.” The FBI responded the day after this statement that, “We have made no such file-by-file examination of the State Department files…We have never made such comment to Senator Tydings.” J. Edgar Hoover sent a letter to Joe denying Tyding’s claim (a copy of the letter is provided on page 284).
The book provides details of the hearings in which McCarthy presented, or attempted to present, information about individuals who had come under suspicion. The outcome was a disgustingly transparent effort to clear people of his charges regardless of the evidence he provided. (The efforts to discredit and destroy him intensified. He had his income tax records investigated in exhausting detail, and the result was that he was given a return for overpaying. His sexual orientation and that of some of his staff was questioned.) The Senate was interested in anything negative about Joe, and, with the exception of a few staunch allies, had very little interest in the information he was presenting. McCarthy targets “…would be given a clean bill of health by Tydings.” I will point out once more that many of the “cleared” targets would later be confirmed to have Communist affiliations at a minimum.
Part three of this review will focus on when attacks on Joe began to take hold mostly because he made the error, in my opinion, of attacking decisions that had been made by General George C. Marshall.