The Ayatollah Begs to Differ
By Hooman Majd

On this blog, we have been making an effort to understand the Islamic world.  Majd says “my hope is that this book, through a combination of stories, history, and personal reflection, will provide the reader a glimpse of Iran and Iranians” and reveal paradoxes of the Iranian character that baffle Americans.  He succeeds.

Majd is the son of an Iranian diplomat raised in the West, and seems well situated to bridge the gap between the two peoples.

Iranians are Persians, not Arabs, and are 90% Shia, not Sunni, Muslim.  Shia believe in the twelfth Imam, who is not dead but hidden, and who will return as the Messiah in a way that reminds me of Christians’ faith in the return of Jesus Christ.  I’m not sure if this similarity will make the two peoples more or less sympathetic to each other, since discussing religion is dangerous outside of trusting relationships.

“Persia” had been “Iran” to Iranians since 226 CE; “Persia” came from the French.  In 1935 a Shah who embraced the Third Reich and fascism decreed that the nation should be called “Iran” which means “land of the Aryans”.  I found it alarming that today Farsi translations of Hitler’s Mein Kampf are prominent in book stores, though some Americans may appreciate that Marx and Communist are loathed by the theocracy.

Many Iranians (especially expats) view the word “Persian” as connoting their glorious past and they are annoyed that Westerners are ignorant of Iran’s history.  Iran was the equal of ancient Egypt, Rome, or Athens.  Westerners admire Alexander the Great, while Iranians view him as a barbarian for burning magnificent Iranian libraries.

“The Shia sense of the world [is] a dark and oppressive place” of “estrangement and woe”, “under a perpetual dark cloud” where “death and martyrdom are pillars of Shia Islam.”  The nation’s recent history reinforces this gloomy outlook: Muslims have suffered “five hundred years of Western hegemony,” and “for two or three hundred years Iran had been [under] Western powers – specifically Britain and then the United States when it took over the mantle of empire after World War II.”

I recall that America was responsible for installing the last Shah, displacing an elected government.  The Shah employed a terrifying secret police and Iranians today feel free to criticize their government in ways that would have landed them in jail under the Shah.

The 1979 crisis when Americans were held hostage arose as part of a revolution against that hated Shah.  I sometimes wonder how long it will take America to fully recover from the Cold War.  I worked in America’s nuclear weapons complex myself, so I understand the dilemma America faced when threatened by the Soviet Union, but actions that were expedient then continue to haunt us today.

History figures in the support Iranians have for today’s government; even when it may threaten them individually, Iranians (even Majd’s Jewish-Iranian friend) feel pride in no longer being “subservient.”  Majd recalls his own expat pride in the revolution: “That was certainly good enough for me [as] a twenty-two year old.”

Ahmadinejad was Iran’s president when this book was written.  Majd explains how his mannerisms and clothes commemorate his lower class roots (which increased his popularity) and his uncompromising stance on nuclear issues represented “throwing off the yolk of colonialism”.  He discusses Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denying: the Holocaust seems very remote to Iranians and they do not take his denials as a serious issue. Majd interviewed a foreign minister who was a rabid Holocaust denier – a position that leaves Majd “in disbelief” since he would like Westerners to know that Iranian diplomats saved many Jews during WWII by evacuating them under Iranian passports.

Majd devotes a couple chapters to reformers in Iran, especially Amadinajan’s liberal predecessor Khatami (liberal by Middle Eastern standards, and remembering that the Iranian theocracy must approve candidates).  Khatami’s reforms to freedom of the press, allowing women less restrictive clothing, and access to the Internet were not entirely reversed by arch-conservative Ahmadinejad.  Khatami had won popular election by a landslide, which makes me wonder how the Iranian electorate could swing in the opposite direction so far by electing Ahmadinejad.  Majd does note that political parties have no tradition in Iran and elections turn on personality.  It is encouraging to learn that liberal reformers, including Muslim clerics, are still active in Iran, but it seems reform will be a slow process.

There are many interesting items in the book; for example:

• Iranian culture places emphasis on the home and privacy, taking the concept of “your home is your castle” farther than most Americans do.  Individual homes are built within high walls and an apartment building may be occupied by members of a single family.  The current Islamic government cares only how citizens behave outside their walls.  There is no shortage of alcohol and drug-fueled parties in the privacy of homes, and opium smoking is a common social event despite being officially condemned by Islamic clergy.  Majd says Iran has a significant drug problem, but smoking opium is “an establishment pass time that young people are little interested in”; the opposite of the American view.
• Iranians use an elaborate social ritual called ta’arouf, “a cultural imperative that is about manners, yes, but is also about gaining advantage, politically, socially, or economically”, in which the parties to an interaction take turns at calculated self-deprecation.
• Most Iranians do not like the fact that today’s population is a mix of many minorities and that the “purest” Persians are Zoroastrians who practice a pre-Islamic religion.  Iranians exhibit racist and ethnic prejudices, and some dislike Ayatollah Khomeine (the founder of the Islamic Republic) because his “tainted” Indian blood wasn’t Persian enough.
• Street toughs and gangs (who claim strong religiosity but routinely indulge in alcohol and prostitutes) have been curbed by the current Iranian government, and their fashions are now imitated by middle class Iranians much as middle class Americans imitate rappers.
• There is a resort ski area in Iran that sounds very European.
• Iranians feel Persian culture is superior in the world, but they can “howl with laughter” poking fun at their own customs
• “Sex has a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ quality” in Iran, and Shia allows for temporary marriages, as short as one hour. Plastic surgery reconstruction of the hymen in prerevolutionary times was common.”  But a sex video of a popular actress, who portrayed a properly demur girl on a soap opera, was a scandal (reflecting the public/private divide).
• Majd notes that fundamentalism in Iran and America contributes to the animosity between the two countries.  He provocatively says “Christian evangelicals” might find today’s Iran “the model for an ideal society they seek in America [if they] replace Allah with God.”

This book offers an interesting view of Iranian culture.  They are a proud people whose political fortunes were in decline during the decades America rose to become a world power.  There seems to be hope for normalizing relations someday, but progress will be frustratingly slow.