The sub-title of this book by Robert M. Farley, “The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force,” reveals the premise. I requested it from the library because I read that it discusses the founding of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in 1947. Military planners had decided many more nuclear weapons were needed for Soviet targets at about that time. That led to the construction of the Rocky Flats Nuclear weapons Plant where the plutonium parts were constructed for all those weapons.  I worked at the Plant for many years beginning with the end of my U.S. Army assignment to NORAD in1969. I was therefore interested in what the military planners were thinking in the late 1940s that led to the beginning of construction at Rocky Flats in 1951. I was disappointed. There is no mention in the book that I found to mention anything about the expansion of Soviet military targets that led to the need for more nuclear weapons. All I could find was that the USAF was assigned most of the nuclear arsenal because of their long-range bombers and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). I decided to post a review, although I believe the book is flawed, at least for my purposes, by what it does not describe.

The book has several discussions of how the USAF being a separate service creates conflicts in military resource allocation, training, procurement, and strategies that are counterproductive. There is no doubt air power is needed for military missions. However, it is explained the war is an extension of politics and adding the politics of competing military services simply makes the act of engaging in war less than efficient. The author even observes that “…independent air forces make war more likely.” The reasoning is that the independent USAF will argue for policies that “…increase its visibility and access to resources” (which will make the USAF commanders more eager to go to war). The service will vie for political advantage by recommending use of its capabilities, and that certainly could and probably has influenced political policy decisions.

There are some sobering statistics about the use of air power in war. Allied bombing raids during World War II were estimated to have killed half a million Europeans with the loss of 81,000 allied aviators. The Japanese Army slaughtered up to a quarter million Chinese civilians searching for the pilots of the “Jimmy Doolittle “raid on Japan.  Incendiary bombing later devastated numerous Japanese cities. The most destructive raid “…took place on March 10, 1945, when 279 B-29s, flying a low altitude, dropped incendiary munitions on Tokyo. The raid caused a firestorm, killing roughly 100,000 Japanese civilians, more than immediately died in either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki atomic attacks.”

The German bombing of English cities during World War II is famous in history (called the “Battle of Britain” by the allies and “England Attack” by the Germans).  Less well known is that Germany  launched zeppelin bombing raids against the United Kingdom , including London, in World War I. The raids did little damage and the Royal Air Force developed aircraft capable of intercepting and pursuing the zeppelins. The Germans responded by developing a long range bomber called the Gotha G.IV by 1917. Those bombers caused British casualties into at least mid-1918. Seven of the thirty-eight bombers were destroyed in the last Gotha raid. However, “…the early Gotha raids electrified British airpower advocates.”

There was a famous U.S. demonstration of U.S. air power in 1921 when General Billy Mitchell’s bombers sank the outdated and unmanned German battleship Ostfriesland in front of disbelieving U.S. naval officers. I make brief mention of this because I wrote a history paper about Billy Mitchell during my college days, although that wasn’t quite as far back as 1921,

A side mention of the development of U.S. nuclear forces is mentioned. The RAND Corporation “…was tasked with developing the theoretical foundation for the USAF’s postwar force structure.” The nuclear age also saw the development of a new fleet of strategic bombers that began with the B-29, B-36 (which was propeller-driven and was too slow), and the B-47 in the earlier days. The B-52 Stratofortress entered service in 1956. Development of ICBMs transformed military planning.

There are interesting discussions about the successes and failures of air power in the Korean War, in Kosovo, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, Iraqi, and Libya. I imagine many remember the remarkable television coverage of the beginning of air attacks on Baghdad and the videos of the “smart bombs” destroying fixed targets in the first Gulf War. The book discusses the air support given to Libyan rebels in that protracted civil war. There is a prescient mention that, “If Libya crumbles back into civil war in the wake of Gadahafi’s fall, it will not reflect well on a strategic concept that promises large returns at minimal risk.

There is an extensive discussion of the advent of drones and the strategies and morality of using them. It is suggested that drone warfare “…places technological novelty ahead of political applicability.”

The book closes by reiterating that the formation of the USAF in 1947 was a mistake. However, there is also a discussion of the bravery of pilots who “…have suffered from some of the most dreadful loss rates of any military profession.” That is undoubtedly added to soothe the anticipated angry response of air force pilots at the recommendation to disband the USAF.