The subtitle of this book by Gregg Herken is “The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller.” Another book by the author, “The Winning Weapon” (a review was posted October 1) concluded that too much was made of Soviet espionage of the Manhattan Project. “Brotherhood of the Bomb” reaches an entirely different conclusion. A footnote on page 126 states “Near the end of the war, because of Fuchs and other spies at Los Alamos, the Russians had a precise description of the component parts of Fat Man, including such engineering details as the makeup and design of the explosive lenses use to compress the plutonium core and the exact dimensions of the bomb’s polonium initiator. The device that the Soviets exploded in their first nuclear test, in August 1949, was essentially a copy of Fat Man.” “The Winning Weapon” was published in 1980 and “Brotherhood of the Bomb” in 2002. Much was learned about the extent of Soviet spying after the first book was published in 1980. For example, the Venona Project that revealed the massive extent of Soviet spying was declassified in 1995. Both books have value to someone interested in the atomic bomb and its impact on the Cold War, and the first gives a good idea of how much of the media looked at the issue of Soviet spying in 1980.
“Brotherhood of the Bomb” gives detailed insight into the scientists who became famous as the result of discovering what could be accomplished, mostly in the form of weapons, with atomic energy. Lawrence had announced in 1932 that “…heavy particles not only disintegrated readily but in the process seemed to release more energy than it took to break them apart.” He proposed a vista of cheap, reliable, and virtually limitless energy…” His “disintegration hypothesis” was greeted with skepticism verging on ridicule. Rutherford made his now famous statement that “anyone who looked for a source of power in the transformation of atoms was talking moonshine.”
Lawrence had come from humble financial beginnings and had sold aluminum cookware door to door to help pay for college. Oppenheimer came from a family with wealth. Despite their differences they became close friends as young men. Lawrence and the young men he worked with on his cyclotron learned from the Curies they were producing radioactivity. He recognized from the announcement of fission by German scientists that chain reactions were possible. Resolution of that question would determine whether “…atomic energy could be used to propel ships and power industry—or to build a bomb.”
The book introduces the long list of physicists who would be involved in the Manhattan Project. Edward Teller, who had been a student of Niels Bohr, had driven Szilard to meet with Einstein. They convinced Einstein to sign the letter that warned Franklin Roosevelt that “the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future,”” It is conceivable… (an) extremely powerful bomb of a new type may thus be constructed.” The letter is often credited with decisions that led to the Manhattan Project.
Oppenheimer’s left-leaning politics are documented early in the book. He was watched carefully by security agents, and his activities often led to increased suspicion. Leslie Groves, the army lead on the Manhattan Project, overlooked the suspicions and even kept some personal admissions of completely inappropriate contacts Oppenheimer confessed to him to himself. Groves was made aware of Soviet spying on the project and he passed details of what American intelligence was learning to Secretary of War Stimson and President Roosevelt. Stimson expressed concern about the information, but the book is silent on what Roosevelt thought. Despite his worries about spying, Groves strongly believed Oppenheimer was not personally involved and that “Oppie” was essential to the success of the project.
Edward Teller is another central character in the book, although he receives less attention than Oppenheimer and Lawrence. Teller’s ego and opinions created problems. He resented that he hadn’t been named head of the Theoretical Division of the Manhattan Project. He also objected to the teamwork concept others thought was critical to the success of the project. He felt that the constant collaboration could result in “…one’s new idea, once hatched, could be taken away and given to others to develop.” He was assigned to a separate project to develop the “Super,” or hydrogen bomb, to end his disruptions.
Significant details are given of the Soviet project to spy on the Manhattan Project that had the code name “Enormoz.” Several American and British spies and their Soviet “handlers” are introduced. The project had the highest priority for both the NKVD and the “neighbors” in the GRU. The success of the spying cannot be disputed with all the information now available, including information from Soviet archives. The book says Moscow had received 300 classified reports about the Manhattan Project and that the Soviet network and encryption system for transferring the secrets was often overwhelmed by the volume of information. Most came from agents in the British laboratories. There is a brief explanation why so many American liberals were willing to help the Soviets. “In most cases, ideology rather than monetary reward was the spur to cooperation. The NKVD depended on the romanticism of American Communists.”
American security agencies were not completely unaware. There is a funny description of the amount of American surveillance on Communists or suspected Communists. Undercover agents were trailing a suspect to a meeting with Soviet agents. The agents arrived to find several FBI agents outside the meeting place wearing “surveillance equipment designed to look like hearing aids.” One agent recalled, “It looked like a convention for the deaf.”
The efforts after the war to strip Oppenheimer of his clearance are described in great detail. One honorable FBI official objected twice to the fact that Oppenheimer’s meetings with his attorneys were bugged and recorded. He objected that it was a clear violation of attorney-client privilege, but was overruled and the recording continued. Groves continued to defend Oppenheimer, but his testimony was weakened because he had to admit he had failed to report Oppenheimer’s meetings with communists and/or “fellow travelers” that Oppenheimer had admitted to him. There were other supporters who testified, but the weight of Oppenheimer’s left connections and the enemies he had accumulated failed to save his Q clearance. (My personal experience with obtaining a Q clearance makes it difficult to believe that any other individual with Oppenheimer’s record could have ever been granted clearance.)
The Justice Department wanted to prosecute several individuals for treason. Alger Hiss was eventually convicted of perjury for lying about his activities and the Rosenbergs were executed. Judith Coplin was found not guilty even though she had been seen handing secret documents to a Soviet agent. She was acquitted when all the evidence against her was thrown out because it had been obtained from or was possible because of illegal wire taps. Many other people who had clearly helped the Soviets never went to trial because it was realized the results would be the same.
This is a worthwhile book for anyone interested in the history of the Cold War and/or the Manhattan Project. I’m certainly in both groups.