This book was written, as stated on the cover page, By Leslie R. Groves, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired. I’ve read several books about the Manhattan Project, and I would put this on at the top of the list to someone who has just developed an interest in the subject. It describes in no uncertain terms the complexity and difficulty of what was being sought and the remarkable achievements that resulted. To General Groves’ credit, he dedicates the book, “To the men and women of the Manhattan Project, and to all those who aided them in their yet unparalleled accomplishment.” I was impressed by the number of times Groves wrote about something going wrong because of something he had done. He shied away from blaming others for problems and gave credit to those who suggested some insight or approach that he had not considered.  My “personal review” of the book that I prepared for use in a new book I’m researching about the history of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant covers twenty-three pages. I promise to impose a much shorter version in this review.

Groves was in charge constructing the Pentagon when he was told he had been selected by the Secretary of War for an important project, and that his selection had been approved by President Roosevelt. I was surprised that Groves knew about what he called “…the atomic development program…,” and responded unenthusiastically, “Oh, that thing.” He met with his commanding General who told him, “The basic research and development are done. You just have to take the rough designs, put them in final shape, build some plants and organize an operating force and your job will be finished and the war will be over.” Groves admits in his book that it took weeks before he had a comprehension of, “…how overoptimistic an outlook he had presented.”

Groves describes the research by physicists that led some to conclude an atomic bomb was possible. Lise Meitner explained to Otto Hahn that the results of his research in Germany indicated the uranium atom could be split and that the resulting fission (a term developed by Meitner and her nephew) would release enormous amounts of energy. The genesis of the Manhattan Project was initiated by scientists Hitler drove out of Germany. Many came to America, and they feared what would happen if the Germans were the first to develop the bomb. One of the problems they faced was that the “…American-born scientists, in the main, did not have so acute and appreciation of the danger…” The process that resulted in Franklin Roosevelt approving research is described in numerous sources, but the Groves account is, in my estimation, adequately complete and to the point.

I’m going to focus on information in the book that added to my knowledge of the story.  As an example, Groves was only able to tell his family, including his son who was in West Point, that he had been assigned to do something secret. “The family first learned of the nature of his new assignment three years later when the bombing of Hiroshima was announced to the rest of the world.”

Groves and the staff assembled to work for him fully understood the magnitude of what they were being asked to do. They knew they needed to acquire as much uranium ore as possible. It wasn’t certain a controlled chain reaction was possible until it was demonstrated by Fermi and his team at the University of Chicago. Groves and the others knew they would need a large facility built from scratch to separate uranium 235 from uranium 238 with technology that barely had been proven experimentally, let alone in a pilot plant. Oak Ridge came into existence based on what limited information was available. Acquisition of the area to build Hanford was completed when only micrograms of plutonium had been created in experimental reactors.

The story of how Groves recruited du Pont to build and manage Hanford is one of the most fascinating aspects of the book. Groves was told by Walter Carpenter, Jr., president of the company, that they were experienced in chemistry and not physics. Carpenter also explained that the company was very cautious about building production facilities to manufacture new products. Groves persisted that the outcome of the war depended on their participation and won the right to make a pitch to first the Executive Committee and then the Board of Directors. He told all of them that the President, Secretary of War Stimson, and General Marshall all believed the project was of utmost importance.

Groves made the presentation to the du Pont Executive Committee and they reminded him of their inexperience in physics and nuclear physics. They explained how many years it had taken them to get nylon in to mass production despite the fact nylon production was simple and safe compared to what Groves was describing. They understood from what Groves told them were it was possible a reactor could go out of control and explode, which would be catastrophic. Plutonium and other fission products were highly toxic, and could present series risks to operating personnel and citizens in the area. The Executive Committee said they did not feel they could refuse, but that they would have to obtain approval from the Board of Directors. That body recognized there was significant danger that participation in the project, which “…could very well severely damage if not well-nigh destroy du Pont.” Groves must have done well at selling that the secret project could end the war. He told the directors   there were  written explanations face down on the table in the front of each director. “Not a single man, and they were all heavy stockholders, turned (the papers over) before voting approval—or afterward—a true display of real patriotism.”

Du Pont refused the first letter of intent that contained provisions for reimbursement of costs plus a fixed fee. “For strictly legal reasons provision was made for a fee of one dollar.” Du Pont was paid the entire fee of one dollar soon after V-J Day. Government auditors disallowed thirty-three cents of the fee because “…the entire time of the contract had not run out…Fortunately, the officers of du Pont had retained their sense of humor throughout their many years of association with the government, and were able to derive considerable amusement from this ruling.”

Groves also describes two varying situations in relations with unions. A union official promised not to try to organize workers at Oak Ridge after Groves convinced him of the importance of the work and that it couldn’t be slowed for any reason. However, union pipe fitters at Hanford refused to speed up their work. Files of soldiers serving in the military were searched to identify men with the needed skill and they were reassigned to Hanford. The union appealed that they shouldn’t work fast. The soldiers replied that the work was much easier than being a soldier, that they were happy about not being shot at, and that they wanted the war to end so their friends could come home. Output by the union pipefitters increased ten percent.

I think it is fair to let Groves end this with the final paragraph in his book. “In answer to the question, ‘Was the development of the atomic bomb by the United State necessary?’ I reply unequivocally, ‘Yes.’ To the question, ‘Is atomic energy a force for good or evil?’ I can only say, ‘As mankind wills it’.”