Category Archives: Nuclear Weapons

Libyan Nuclear Weapons

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Supporters of Muammar Gaddafi continue to resist rebel forces in two cities as I type this. There have been concerns about the fate of chemical weapons stores in Libya, but the world can celebrate that Gaddafi was convinced to give up development of nuclear weapons in 2003.

An article on Globalsecurity.org w discusses that Libya wanted to develop nuclear weapons to counteract the weapons believed to be held by Israel. They were willing to work with any country to obtain the training and equipment necessary to operate a nuclear weapons development program.  Argentina sent geologists to Libya to teach methods of uranium prospecting and processing, and the Libyans obtained uranium “yellow cake” from Niger in 1978. India agreed to work with them in development of peaceful nuclear technology, and France agreed to build a nuclear research facility to power a water desalination plant. There were inquiries for nuclear weapons technology to China, North Korea, and Pakistan.  The Soviet Union helped staff a nuclear research facility outside of Tripoli, and at one time planned to build a small reactor for the Libyans. The Japanese provided them the technology necessary to operate uranium processing facilities.

U.S. intelligence had warned that Libya would have deployable nuclear weapons by 2007, but according to the article previously mentioned there were secret talks between Libya, the United States, and Great Britain after that warning. Gaddafi requested the talks immediately after the invasion of Iraq (Wikipedia reference) by 148,000 American, 45.000 British, 2000 Australian, and 194 Polish soldiers. George Bush and Tony Blair announced the invasion was to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people. It is common knowledge that weapons of mass destruction were not found (see the posting dated December 31, 2010 titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass destruction).

Libya continued with efforts to obtain processing equipment despite the talks. In October 2003 a U.S.-led naval operation under the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative intercepted a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. That operation apparently convinced the Libyans they could not continue with plans for development of nuclear weapons and it was announced on December 19, 2003 that they had agreed to destroy all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  The agreement provided that Libya’s facilities could be inspected, and one official stated the opinion they were much further along in their development than had been previously thought. Twenty-five tons of equipment and uranium were removed and delivered to the United States. The New York Times reported there were 4,000 centrifuges of Pakistani design that might have been manufactured in Malaysia in the material shipped to the United States. Documents recovered during inspections included design information for a Chinese nuclear weapon. There was also information that as much as $100 million dollars had been paid by Libya to Pakistani scientists for information and equipment.

Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was instrumental in the international illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. He was involved in development of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capability, and he established a network of scientists, suppliers, and front companies that provided Libya, North Korea, and Iran nuclear weapons technology and equipment. Michael Laufer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace developed a chronology of Khan’s activities.  Khan had acquired the blueprints for a Chinese bomb by the early 1980s. It was reported that he was approached by “…an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance.” Iran obtained centrifuges from Pakistan that were no longer needed by that country in 1989. Shipments of centrifuges to Libya began in 1997 and continued until they ended their programs in 2003.

There is no doubt Muammar Gaddafi had committed to arm himself with nuclear weapons. I did not agree with the decision to invade Iraq, and there have been many negative consequences of that invasion. However, there was one important positive achieved by that invasion. Gaddafi began negotiations with the U.S. and Britain on weapons of mass destruction immediately after coalition forces entered Iraq. The interception of centrifuges and other equipment by the U.S. Navy a few months later pushed him to end his programs and ship the equipment to the United States. It is frightening to think what might have been if Gaddafi had nuclear weapons when the rebels began to take over Libya.

The Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant Plea Bargain

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I’ve received comments from knowledgeable people that questioned some of the things I wrote in my book titled “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths Debunked.” It has been interesting to do additional research in an attempt to better understand the issues questioned. I mentioned in the book I do not consider myself to be a Rocky Flats expert; the plant was far too large and complex for anyone to claim to be an expert. The comments verify that observation.

For those unfamiliar with the story, the government raided the plant in June of 1989 with dozens of federal agents after delivering a search warrant alleging sensational environmental crimes. I was the Manager of Environmental Management, and was frightened because I thought something really terrible must have been happening to justify such a large and highly publicized raid. It wasn’t long before I realized the agents knew very little about Rocky Flats, and they didn’t seem to be on the trail of anything specific. I would later verify they quickly learned they had been duped by tips from uninformed people who disagreed with the mission of the plant. The investigators also had misinterpreted physical evidence that they believed proved some of the allegations. The eventual guilty plea by Rockwell International, the operator of the plant at the time of the raid, was based on trumped-up charges that had nothing to do with the search warrant. The government insistence on a plea bargain was driven, in my opinion, by officials unwilling to admit they had made an embarrassing mistake.

Comments from a former Rocky Flats contractor who is familiar with how corporations balance legal and business risks and a person who was a senior DOE manager both disagree with what I wrote answering why Rockwell agreed to plead guilty. I speculated they agreed to the plea bargain and to pay an 18.5 million dollar fine to save the reputations of Rockwell managers being threatened with indictment. Both of the commenters say it was a business decision. Rockwell had already accumulated significant legal costs, and those costs were continuing to increase by about a million dollars a month. Trials that could have lasted two or three years would not have been good for the corporate reputation regardless of outcome, and the media circus that would have been created would have been a distraction from other business matters.

There is disagreement on one issue. One person thought the government decided to force a plea bargain on Rockwell after they “went nuts” when there were indications the Grand Jury was considering indicting one or more Department of Energy Officials along with several Rockwell people. The DOE official says that isn’t true, because the threat of indictments from the Grand Jury came a year or two after the plea bargain, and that the government “…did not care about the indictment of federal employees.” That person believes the government’s motivation to settle was that they did not want trials “…to disclose the trumped up nature of their search warrant.”   I’m inclined to believe the opinion offered by the DOE official.

Changing subjects to one of the “crimes” included in the guilty plea, the DOE official disagreed with what I wrote regarding Rockwell agreeing to pay $2,000,000 in fines for failure to file a permit application for a waste storage area. Rockwell wrote in the report they provided to the court about the guilty plea that they had delivered the permit application to the DOE office, and had “…no knowledge of what happened thereafter until the application was filed by DOE, apparently six months later.” (United States District Court (Defendants) March 26, 1992, pages 54-55) The DOE official wrote the application submittal was delayed because what Rockwell gave to DOE was “woefully inadequate.” I’ve had several back and forth messages with several people to try to sort this out, and I now believe the commenter was referring to a different permit application that the one that resulted in the fine. What I’ve learned from this is confirmation that the permit application process was complicated and filled with opportunities for disagreement between Rockwell, DOE, and the federal agencies that would make it difficult to prepare a permit application and submit it on schedule.

What I haven’t found is why Rockwell was forced to pay a two million dollar fine for failure to submit the application when, according to the statement submitted by Rockwell to the court, it was DOE that failed to submit the application. The DOE official wrote that both Rockwell and DOE were responsible for filling the application. However, that wouldn’t explain why only Rockwell was held accountable for failure to meet the application submital schedule. I concede I don’t know whether the application was submitted late because what Rockwell provided was inadequate. Who did what or who was most at blame might continue to be in dispute, but it is a fact that this was a paperwork problem and not an environmental problem. No one has yet questioned my continued belief that the plea bargain was too absurd to stand up to any kind of scrutiny. John F. Seymour wrote in an article titled “U.S. v. Rockwell:  GOCO Assessed Criminal Fines for Violations at Rocky Flats,” in the summer 1992 Federal Facilities Environmental Journal, that “…the plea bargain involves relatively mundane and commonplace…violations.” The DOE official said it well, “One of the crazy aspects of our legal system these days is the assignment of felonies to what should be civil matters.”  I think a final comment from that person is a good closing. “I have told people that RFP (Rocky Flats Plant) was never as good or as bad as it was alleged.”

Comments about Rocky Flats Book

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I published “An Insider’s Review of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths Debunked” free at the book link on this web site or as a paperback on Amazon a little less than a year ago. The centerpiece of the book is description of the government raid of the nuclear weapons component production plant with sensational allegations about environmental crimes while I was Manager of Environmental Management. The government raid and two and a half year Grand Jury investigation failed to find evidence of any of the crimes alleged in the highly publicized search warrant. However, the government managed to extract a trumped-up guilty plea and an $18.5 million fine from Rockwell, the contractor who operated the plant at the time, to save the reputations of Justice Department officials who had been duped by tips from people who didn’t like what the plant manufactured. I wrote on the back cover of the book, “An apology from the government to the people who worked at Rocky Flats is overdue.”

I was uncertain what kind of reception the book would receive, especially since it told a story much different than what had been widely reported by the media and was highly critical of government actions. The comments have been dominantly positive, with many compliments from fellow Rocky Flats employees. Some people contacted me to reinforce what I wrote about the FBI raid, the fact there wasn’t midnight burning or illegal discharges of toxins, and other events. I’ve also received positive comments from activists who protested the plant and others who were interested observers.

The first critical comment I received was, “I skimmed through your book and couldn’t help but notice that you cite ‘Ambushed Grand Jury’ as one of your sources, then cherry pick two sentences from that book to make it look as if the arguments in the book support your own. Really, aren’t you ashamed of yourself just a little?”  I responded to the message that I wasn’t ashamed of myself or the book and provided details about the several positive comments I made about the Grand Jury. I copied one of the authors of the “Ambushed Grand Jury,” but did not receive responses from either the commenter or the author.

The second critical comment was from a former DOE manager who took me to task for writing Dow tried to prevent using the 903 pad for outdoor waste storage. (Contamination from that storage area resulted in the largest amount of plutonium lost off site in the history of the plant.) I blamed the Atomic Energy Commission for the decision, but I now accept that Dow management also deserved its share of blame. What was done is easy to criticize with hindsight; it was a different world then with the country engaged in a nuclear arms race with the Soviets. The decision to store waste outside in barrels was consistent with the practices accepted in those times despite the fact that everyone now wishes things were done differently.  I’ve done more research, and posted a blog on September 14th that gives details of what I’ve learned so far. A short summary is that bureaucracy prevented both Dow and AEC from taking common sense actions to reduce the amount of plutonium dispersed.  I intend to keep looking for information on the subject.

I believe the criticism from the DOE manager was justified, but I wasn’t personally bothered by it. I wrote what I believed to be true based on the information I had been told by coworkers. The challenge caused me to dig into the issue in more detail, and I’m pleased to have now presented a more accurate assessment. However, I’ve now received a comment from a person I always respected that questions what I wrote about how the source involving a tritium release was identified. I wrote that the manager who had hired me called to suggest samples be collected from a glove box where some material from another site was processed. I wrote that I collected a sample as suggested, and that sample identified the glove box to be the source of the release. The responder wrote that he collected a sample, delivered it to me, and heard nothing about the results. He then brought a second sample to me, but still received no information. I have no reason to question the memory of this person, but I’m hoping that the first sample he mentions was delivered before the equipment needed to analyze for tritium been received and put into operation. I don’t recall receiving either sample from him, but have no doubt he delivered them to someone in the environmental testing laboratory. I assure everyone that I believed in the accuracy of what I was writing at the time I wrote and published it. I will take some solace from the fact the incident was too embarrassing to everyone who had believed the tritium couldn’t have been from the plant for any rewards to have been given to anyone involved in identifying the source.

I continue to solicit comments on my book or other stories about Rocky Flats. It was a huge, complicated place, and as I’ve written previously, there is no such thing as a “Rocky Flats expert.”

Making a Real Killing—Operations, Legal Actions, and Controversies

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This is the second half of my review about the book by Len Ackland. The first half was about the history of homesteading and development of the area that included Rocky Flats by the Church family beginning in 1861 and the selection of part of their land for the construction of a new nuclear weapons production plant. This part of the review will briefly summarize what was written about early years of operation when the plant was more or less considered “invisible” to neighbors and the later years when accidents and incidents led to a precipitous decline in the reputation of the place.  I wrote that I would restrict myself to doing a non-editorializing review, and I succeeded at that in the first half of my review of the book. I disagree with some of what is mentioned in this half, and I intend to post a blog discussing those items. An asterisk indicates that you can read a differing view on the blog site. I suggest reading that blog and my book “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths Debunked to get another perspective about Rocky Flats.

The first building constructed on the Rocky Flats site, was named “Building D”, and would eventually be called Building 991. The book calls it “…the atomic bomb assembly building.”* In those early days everyone working at the plant had to have a “Q clearance” issued after background investigations by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Building 771 was constructed later to allow a multitude of operations including the ability to process solutions containing plutonium, and it would be the location of the first major accident in 1957 resulting in an uncontrolled release of plutonium. A fire breached the filter plenums in the exhaust system until fire fighters brought it under control with water. The workers (there were about 2000 at the time) were concerned that the facility would not be brought back on line, and that their jobs would be lost. However, resources were dedicated to decontamination and repair, and the building was brought back into production. Not surprisingly, the fire created an increase in focus on safety. However, there was little outside attention given to the accident, in part because the official accident report issued by the AEC called it a “serious accident,” but didn’t name Rocky Flats. The accident had occurred within the memory of the harsh Soviet suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, which “…confirmed the regime’s brutality…” “Most Americans, including the managers and employees at Rocky Flats, accepted the notion that the United States had to win the nuclear arms race in order to defeat communism.” Continue reading →

Comments about the Book, “Making a Real Killing”

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The book by Len Ackland is a well-researched source of information about Rocky Flats that I recommend. I posted a two part review of the book on that link of this web site, and committed to not editorializing in writing that review. The first part posted 9/7/11 is mostly about the history of Rocky Flats tied to the Church family, and the second part posted 9/14/11discusses operations, legal actions, and controversies. This posting discusses my disagreements with some of what Mr. Ackland wrote, and I suggest reading my book “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths Debunked” for another perspective. That book is available free on this web site or from Amazon. I’ve heard that “history is interpretive,” and the differences between Mr. Ackland’s presentation of the history of Rocky Flats and mine confirms that observation. I intend to provide the content of the two part review and this posting to Mr. Ackland

There is criticism in “Making a Real Killing” about the selection of the Rocky Flats site for construction of a new nuclear weapons component production facility.  The book says the AEC knew they wanted Denver to be the location, but they went through the motions of an open selection process. I’ve read the Project Apple report (the report about the selection of a site for the plant), and there were compelling reasons given in that report for selecting a Denver location.  All of the other locations in other states had high humidity, and the production processes needed low humidity. Denver also was judged to be a good location for attracting and housing skilled workers. The author observed that the evaluation used wind data from Stapleton Field, and that actual Rocky Flats wind data “…should have eliminated Rocky Flats…”  The Stapleton Field wind rose showed the wind blowing to the north just under a fourth of the time and to the south about ten percent of the time. The wind would be blowing toward a populated area at all times from either Stapleton Field, Rocky Flats, or from any of the other six Denver locations considered, including the alternate location adjacent to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. I posted a more detailed discussion of the Project Apple report on July 27, 2011.

The book mentions that “Building D,” which would later be designated Building 991, was the first built at Rocky Flats. The author calls it “…the atomic bomb assembly building.” Rocky Flats constructed components for atomic bombs, but no atomic bombs were assembled there.

The 903 pad was largest source of plutonium contamination released by Rocky Flats, and it is mentioned that the drums were removed from the pad in 1968. “Then, reflecting the same nonchalant approach to nuclear waste that led plant managers to create this temporary storage area in the first place, the field sat uncovered and subject to wind dispersion until July 1969. I have been challenged about the discussion in my book blaming AEC for the problems and stating that Dow argued against the pad and the way it was managed. That has led me to seek more information, and my search isn’t over. However, I’ve been consistently told that the paving project was held up for several months because engineering groups in the AEC Albuquerque Area Office and AEC headquarters were in dispute about the design of the cap that was to be added. Part of the delay was to complete a required Davis Bacon Act review. The act required that all federal construction exceeding $2,000 total cost must pay workers on-site no less than locally prevailing wages. I have been consistently told that there was frustration that the paving wasn’t completed more quickly, but I’ve found little evidence that the delay was caused by taking a “nonchalant approach.” I intend to continue looking for information about this issue, and hope to do a more detailed posting in the future.

There are several observations that worker safety and fire safety took a backseat to production, and the Building 771 fire in 1957 and the Building 776/777 fire in 1969 certainly proves there should have been more care taken with fire safety. I know that fire safety wasn’t ignored before the 1969 fire, because one of my tasks after that fire was to test remaining glove box windows to determine which ones contained fire retardants. The fire retardant windows were obviously installed for fire safety, but that didn’t prevent the windows in the lines affected by the fire from melting and burning. The retardants created dense smoke that made the efforts of the fire fighters much more difficult. The information about a million pounds of Benelex to provide radiation protection to workers contradicts at least in this one instance the inference that worker safety was downplayed, although the Benelex played a major role in the 1969 fire. Also on the subject of worker safety, interviews with Union officials often focused on that subject. I will point out that the Union found safety gave them significant leverage in getting concessions from management. The Department of Energy also discovered they could obtain substantial increases to funding by criticizing health and safety practices.

In my experiences, safety concerns were given priority over schedule; the need to operate safely was discussed at least daily. There was never a doubt that we were working with dangerous materials, and that care was required to protect ourselves and our coworkers. Of course there were nearly two decades of operations before I began my Rocky Flats career, so I can’t testify how things were then. However, I will remind that any discussion of why production schedules were important should include remembering the world situation while debating the need for Rocky Flats, what was made there, and whether production should have been given a high priority. I can see no debate that the people working at Rocky Flats were assigned a national defense mission that the military and government determined was a crucial.  Mr. Ackland provides a solid basis to justify why production was emphasized. He writes that the Joint Chiefs concluded in 1949 that the133 nuclear weapons stipulated in “…war plan Trojan…” wouldn’t be enough. By 1950, “The military’s plans meant ‘a greatly increased requirement for atomic weapons’.” In the 1960s, “Most Americans, including the managers and employees at Rocky Flats, accepted the notion that the United States had to win the nuclear arms race to defeat communism.”

The book mentions that the Pugwash Conferences “…founded by U.S. and Soviet scientists in 1957, advocated alternatives to a balance of nuclear terror between the two ‘superpowers’.”  What isn’t mentioned is that the Pugwash Conference was a front for the Soviet Union, (from Wikipedia) “…whose agents often managed to weaken Pugwash critique of USSR and instead concentrated on blaming the United States and the West.” Not mentioned in the book is the World Peace Council. That organization “…received $63 million in Soviet funding, criticized western armaments and weapons tests, and refrained from criticizing Russian arms.” Numerous peace groups were closely connected with the World Peace Council.

Mr. Ackland mentions the ballot initiative that Colorado voters approved to halt “peaceful” nuclear blasts in the state after the AEC detonated four atomic devices underground in western Colorado. I was surprised he didn’t mention that the 1982 ballot included a proposed amendment to the Colorado constitution to “…bring about the cessation of nuclear weapons component production in Colorado…” The proposal was defeated by 584,256 opposed to 326,550 in favor. Voters were said to have been influenced by the thousands of jobs at the plant and the positive economic impact for the Denver area. I think it is fair to point out that the people of Colorado were aware of what Rocky Flats was making by that time and knew of contamination released by the 1957 fire, the 903 pad, and the tritium incident. They choose jobs.

In the discussion of the tritium incident it is mentioned that Dow was criticized “…for its flat denials and inaction in trying to identify the tritium source.”  A Rocky Flats employee was quoted as saying “…I knew what was wrong. I knew Dow was lying,” I attended meetings when Colorado first reported elevated tritium levels downstream of Rocky Flats, and I was heavily involved with the investigation to identify the source of the tritium after the results were confirmed.  Dow and the AEC were both wrong when they denied the tritium came from Rocky Flats, but they did not lie. Tritium was not supposed to be involved in site operations. Material containing tritium was received from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Rocky Flats was not informed that there was tritium in the material. I attended a meeting preceding a press conference about the release, and the Energy Research and Development (ERDA) manager (ERDA had replaced AEC) told us AEC had failed to control material, and that Dow was blameless in the matter.

Perhaps my strongest complaint about the book is some of the information in Chapter Fourteen titled “Rockwell’s Crimes.” I have no dispute with the statement that “…Rockwell International Corporation pleaded guilty to committing ten environmental crimes—five felonies and five misdemeanors—at Rocky Flats.” I will refer to my detailed descriptions and reasons for the guilty plea in my book, but I give a quick summary here. Rockwell was forced to plead guilty because the Justice Department was threatening to issue indictments that at least some of the prosecutors believed weren’t supported by the evidence. Rockwell knew indictments would ruin lives regardless of the outcome of a trial.  Mr. Ackland accurately writes, “Investigators failed to prove the most spectacular crimes alleged in the June 1989 search warrant.” What he doesn’t say is that the ten “crimes” in the guilty plea would not have been called crimes anywhere other than in a legal document designed to prevent government embarrassment. As examples, sewage treatment plants at places other than Rocky Flats often exceed their permitted discharge limits, and sometimes municipalities and other operators have had to pay fines for those exceedences. However, I am unaware of any other circumstance where the exceedences have been called crimes or where the fines levied were anywhere close to what Rockwell paid. My favorite “crime” was Rockwell pleading guilty to the fact that DOE had submitted a permit application  more than six months after Rockwell had provided it to them and six months after the date it was due. Rockwell pleaded guilty to inaction by DOE and paid a two million dollar fine. The intense scrutiny from a raid by dozens of federal agents and a Grand Jury investigation that lasted over two years found nothing that hadn’t been reported to the regulators before the raid. Rockwell helped save the reputations of embarrassed federal officials by paying millions of dollars in fines for elevated levels of non-toxic pollutants in sewage plant discharges and paperwork errors.

I wish Mr. Ackland would have mentioned that there was no off site impact from any of the ten “crimes,” that they weren’t mentioned in the search warrant, and they weren’t uncovered by the raid. They were “discovered” in official reports submitted by Rocky Flats to Colorado and EPA before the raid. I do credit Mr. Ackland with mentioning that the Radiological Assessments Corporation was hired by the state health department to analyze contamination released by Rocky Flats. He writes, “They haven’t found significant off-site contamination.”  I will point out that the final report said, “The records clearly indicate recognition of the need to control and limit radionuclide releases since the beginning of plant operations…none of the documentation included the occurrence of any previously unreported major events…” Is anyone else fascinated that no historian or investigative reporter has looked into the absurdity of the guilty plea forced on Rockwell?

Making a Real Killing, Rocky Flats and the Nuclear West—Early History

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This book by Len Ackland is researched well, and I recommend it as one book to read about the Rocky Flats plant that produced components for nuclear weapons in Colorado. The title gives away the fact that Mr. Ackland’s point of view differs from the views I presented in my book “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats, Urban Myths debunked.” However, in several instances of where common subjects are discussed, factual information in the two books is often virtually identical. I give Mr. Ackland credit for his extensive discussion of the history of the area and the Church family, which is not included in my book. I intend to restrict myself to doing a non-editorializing review in this first part of the review. The part of the review is about homesteading in the Rocky Flats area by the Church family in 1861, development of the area, and the “taking” of some of the Church land for the construction of a new nuclear weapons production plant. The second half will be about the operation of Rocky Flats, accidents, legal actions, and controversies. I will post a blog after that review discussing some points of disagreement I have with what is in the book.

The history of the Church family is nicely woven into the book, and the first chapter gives a well-written description of when George Henry Church and Sarah (Miller) Church beginning with when they arrived in Colorado in 1861 “…seeking adventure and gold.” Striking it rich with gold didn’t work out, and the couple eventually settled down to farm and raise cattle. Henry built a system of ditches and reservoirs to provide water to the enterprises, and that was a significant contribution to the settlement and development of the entire area. Homesteaders were subsidized by the federal government, “But that reality wouldn’t make the government’s later taking of Rocky Flats land go down any easier for the Churches.” The government offered $18 an acre but paid several times that figure after Marcus Church rejected the first offer and took legal action.

The second chapter details the influence of U.S. Senator Edwin Johnson , or “Big Ed,” of Colorado in the selection of a Colorado location for “Project Apple,” which was the name given to the effort to select a location for the new nuclear weapons plant that would eventually adopted the name “Rocky Flats.” He formed a bipartisan team with Eugene Milliken, and the two of them together were able to influence the location of several military facilities in Colorado. The first was the Rocky Mountain Arsenal followed by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the Air Force Academy. Both senators were on the Congressional Atomic Energy Committee and were strong supporters of anything that would be advantageous to U.S. uranium mining. Johnson was chairman of the Senate’s Military Affairs Committee by the end of World War II. Milliken helped draft the Atomic Energy Act that formed the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear policy. The Atomic Energy Commission was busy in the late 1940s demanding increasing numbers of nuclear weapons. They identified seventy Soviet targets requiring 133 atomic bombs. The military contended that “…scheduled bomb production should be substantially increased and extended,” and that they needed more than 133 nuclear weapons. The military had identified 5,000 to 6,000 “…prospective Soviet nuclear targets…” by the time construction had begun at Rocky Flats. Continue reading →