Rocky Flats Fear Continues

There was a recent news article about the Rocky Flats Wildlife Refuge that reminded me anything about Rocky Flats will be vilified regardless of the facts. The article begins, “Millions of dollars in federal funds to help tie a major regional trail into the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge may be in jeopardy, as communities near the refuge wrestle with the troubled legacy of the former nuclear weapons plant.” Superior and Westminster have decided not to provide their share of the funds needed to support the $6.5 million in federal funds required for the project. The proposed project would “…build two underpasses and one overpass to provide people and animals access to the refuge across Indiana Street and Colorado 128.” The federal grant requires a minimum of $1.1 million from local communities, and Superior and Westminster have declined to provide their required portion of the total. A Boulder official said, “If they’re going to do this, they’re going to have to do additional soil sampling,” she said. “If there is nothing to be afraid of, why can’t we sample to assuage the public of concerns that this is something dangerous.”

I’ve advocated that one unintended consequence of building Rocky Flats Plant is that it resulted in protection of a large swath of high mountain prairie from development. Those who call themselves “environmentalists” should be actively advocating that the proposed project would allow many people to experience that beautiful protected vista. I doubt that it will be possible, because the usual fear mongers will work to attract sufficient negative press to stop the project.

The manager of the refuge commented that “The vision for the Greenway Trail was to connect open spaces… (and that ) He’s confident that with time and accurate information, most communities will buy in to the underpass-overpass project.” I’m less confident based on the Boulder official’s comment about the need for sampling to determine whether there is “…something dangerous.” I assure you that there will be plutonium detected in samples from the area of the proposed project. I also assure you that there would be plutonium detected in the backyard of that Boulder official’s home. There also would be plutonium in the backyard of anyone reading this posting regardless of whether they are in Colorado or any other state. The entire earth was contaminated with plutonium by the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and there will be little difference in the results from the area of the proposed project or anywhere else on the planet.

I suggest officials should also sample the dust on their office desk and/or the dirt in the landscape around their offices to allow themselves to report a comparison in the amount of plutonium detected. I predict the results would be similar.

Rocky Flats Museum Update

Murph Widdowfield is the Board President of the Museum and recently sent an update. He first gave a brief history of the development of the atom bomb and how it changed the outcome of World War II. He then thanked “…the people who worked in the nuclear industry and the others who protected us during the period of the Cold War for their efforts, safety, and labor…”

He added a paragraph that I will quote in its entirety about progress on a visitor center at Rocky Flats. “I also want to tell you about the progress of a Visitors Center at Rocky Flats which will be built by US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) on the Refuge.  A site selection contractor and USFWS have determined that the building will be on the North side of the refuge, with the entrance on Highway 128, a little West of McCaslin Blvd.  The building will not be large with most of the displays based on the refuge with a very small area for the Rocky Flats Cold War Museum.  Also, the new Green Way Trail from Rocky Mountain Arsenal through the Two Ponds Wildlife Refuge in Arvada, up to Boulder and then on up to Rocky Mountain National Park will cross over the northern side of the wildlife refuge although it will bypass the new Visitors Center.”

You can email the museum at info@rockyflatsmuseum.org.

Rocky Flats Museum Still Searching for Home

A recent article describes how members of a nonprofit have “…salvaged thousands of items during the decontamination and destruction of the Rocky Flats Plant.” They are searching for a permanent space for the artifacts after years of moving in and out of temporary spaces. There had been a federal grant of $492,000 obtained by former U.S. senator Wayne Allard in 2007 to find a space, but that money is gone.

The directors are paying about $600/month out of pocket for storage rental and other expenses. The items in storage include 400 boxes of photographs, maps and drawings along with thousands of items such as glove boxes and safety and monitoring equipment. Museum president Murph Widdowfield said, “Our goal is to find space for a small display so the Rocky Flats Plant can live on and continue educating people.” Museum historian Ron Heard said, “It’s one of those stories that’s not a happy story—the building of nuclear weapons—but it’s a part of Colorado history.” The vice president, Larry Wilson, “…said the items not only help tell the story of the country’s nuclear legacy, but also the story of Jefferson County.”

Scott Surovchak, Rocky Flats legacy site manager for the Department of Energy, added that “…more than 100,000 workers passed through the site in the course of its roughly 50-year history, allowing a middle-class buildout of Arvada, Broomfield, and Westminster.” He added that the board wants a place to take grandkids and great-grandkids to show them and the general public, “here’s what we did.”

I find it encouraging that Surovchak commented, “The current board is different than the original group, which included a bunch of the ‘anti crowd’.” That’s a welcome change from the time when I volunteered to help inventory what was in many of all those boxes and write papers about the history of the plant.

America’s Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950

I’ve mentioned that I have been working on a book to explain the decision to build the Rocky Flats Plant where nuclear weapon components were manufactured from 1953 until 1989. The 15 volume set edited by Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg contains a wealth of information about the war plans created by the military that helps explain that decision. First and foremost is the belief that the objective of the Soviet Union was to select a time when they could invade Western Europe to begin the process of imposing Communist control of the world. The set, which consists of oversized books, “…reproduces in facsimile 98 plans and studies created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

The JCS in 1945 believed that Moscow was not ready to launch a Third World War until they had rebuilt their war machine, but as prudent planners they had to prepare for armed conflict on a global scale earlier than expected. The plans, which were all classified Top Secret or Secret and occasionally were also marked to contain Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) restricted data, were of course all declassified before the series was published. I will warn that you won’t find the volumes on Amazon, or at least I didn’t. My local public library was able to find several of them on interlibrary loan. I’ll give all the detail I know about Volume 1 at the end of this review if a reader wants to try to obtain the volume by the same process.

American war plans included:

  • Emergency War Plans for a conflict during the next fiscal year
  • Mid-Range War Plans for a war two to five years in the future
  • Long Range War Plans for a war five to ten years in the future
  • Industrial Mobilization Plans describing a general war to provide guidance for military and economic mobilization planning
  • Special studies, which describe a global conflict in order to guide long range fiscal planning

Supporting papers included:

  • Estimates of Soviet power (and their overwhelming advantage in men under arms)
  • Logistic feasibility studies of American war plans (which were often  found to not be feasible)
  • Examinations of the impact of atomic weapons on the future of modern warfare (which were not encouraging for the protection of American cities and offensive capabilities)

America and Allies no match for Soviet army:

All of the war plans recognized that the huge Soviet and Satellite armies would be able to overwhelm the relatively small allied forces. Earlier plans listed “…the possession and, until 1949, a presumed monopoly of atomic weapons…” and a large and expanding industrial base to be the main advantages of America and its allies. The plans virtually conceded that the Soviet armies could decisively and quickly take Western Europe and most of the Middle East. The allies hoped to be able to establish and maintain “…bases in Great Britain, Egypt, Japan, and possibly northern India and Greenland, from which to launch the strategic air offensive…The liberation of Western Europe would not be the result of direct military operations, but rather a function of the presumed Soviet collapse under the combined weight of the atomic and conventional aerial attack and the counteroffensive against the southern regions of the USSR…the United States would not seek to defend or recover any positions on the Asian mainland, a position that remained unchanged even after the start of the Korean War.”

As an example of an individual plan, the first was “JIS 80/7, 23 October 1945, Russian Capabilities.” The Joint Intelligence Staff prepared this report “To estimate the Russian political situation with particular emphasis on aims and potentialities for expansion of her sphere of influence by means short of war, by 1 January 1948…” World War II had left the Soviets at a high level of political prestige, but weakened by massive destruction and loss of life. A major weakness was the lack of an atomic bomb capability.

I’ll give you a flavor of what the plans included by summarizing “JCS 1477/1 30 October 1945, Over-All Effect of Atomic Bomb on Wartime Organizations.”

The plan states that the greatest effect of development of the atomic bomb was the security of the United States after another country acquires that weapon. It was noted that an aggressor nation with atomic weapons could “…achieve the effects of Pearl Harbor on a vast and relatively complete scale.”The risk presented by another country acquiring the weapons “…emphasizes the importance not only of readiness for immediate defense, but also for striking first, if necessary, against the source of threatened attack.” The only defense against atomic attack is by destroying the carriers in flight, and lessons from World War II indicated that defense cannot be total. Some planes would get through and cities would be destroyed. It was estimated at the time of the report (30 October 1945), that, “…the United States has a head start which is roughly estimated as the equivalent of five years of technological advantage.” (That estimate wasn’t far off.) It was also stated that the U.S. had control of “…major sources of uranium and other essential ores.” (That statement turned out to be incorrect.) It was recommended that there be an accumulation of a “…stockpile of atomic bombs and other new weapons sufficient to implement United States strategic war plans.” That last statement is an example of why the series goes a long way in supporting the decision to build Rocky Flats.  

I may post reviews of some other volumes, but you’ll have to wait for me to finish the book before you see my full assessment of what is include.

Information on the series:

Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg, editors, America’s Plans for War Against the Soviet Union 1945-1950, A 15 volume set reproducing in facsimile 98 plans and studies created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Garland Series, 1989-1990. The information in this posting is from Volume 1, which has a subtitle of The Strategic Environment.

The Man Behind the Rosenbergs Again

man-behindI recently decided to reread this book by retired KGB agent Alexander Feklisov with Sergei Kostin hoping to better understand why Americans were willing to spy for the Soviet Union during World War II. Communism and “the worker’s paradise” of the USSR was a lure during the crushing poverty created by the Great Depression. There was also the belief by some that Communism was the only viable protection from Fascism, although the mutual defense pact signed by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union confused some of those people. Many of the people recruited by the Soviets were American Jews who were children of Russian immigrants. They were convinced that the United States should share any useful technology with the Soviet Union as an ally in the war against Hitler. Feklisov saw those people as “anti-Fascist activists” who were heroes and not spies.  Feklisov managed large networks of American spies, and his book provides insight into their motivations.

Feklisov mentions that many U.S. politicians weren’t friendly to the Soviet Union. Harry Truman as a Senator expressed the point of view about the conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, that “…if Germany is winning we must help Russia; if Russia was winning, the help should go to Germany.” The first prize for bluntness would go to the New York Daily News, which published a cartoon depicting the USSR and Germany as two snakes fighting each other. The caption read, ‘Let’s let them eat each other’.” Feklisov portrays FDR as being a moderate whose attitude toward the USSR, which was “…bearing the brunt of the war efforts, was favorable.”  Continue reading

The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960

national securityI was able to get this book on an interlibrary loan, but the book wasn’t available on Amazon. The United States Military Academy at West Point held a symposium April 21-23, 1982 with the above title. It has some crucial information about why the decision was made to build a site for construction of more nuclear weapons, which is the subject of my quest to write a book about the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. The book comprises seven essays presented at the symposium with an introduction and conclusion prepared by the editor. The “…burgeoning fears of the U.S.S.R…determined character and magnitude of American security policy.” “What began as a cautious and contested move toward nuclear power in the Truman years evolved under Eisenhower into a massive nuclear arsenal of almost incomprehensible proportions.”

The introduction by Norman A Gaebner discusses how Americans generally viewed the Soviet Union after World War II as “…a valiant ally.” However, diplomats who dealt with the Soviets predicted trouble despite FDR’s assurances that he and Stalin “got along fine.” Events following the war proved the Soviets intended to use the land power it had gained and American politicians took note. Arthur Vandenberg, Republican leader in the Senate wrote in his diary, “FDR’s appeasement of Russia is over.” James Forrestal advocated a showdown with the Soviets in the spring of 1945 rather than later. The United States was in a position of power with its atomic monopoly and two thirds of the world’s capital wealth. The Soviet Union had lost more than 2000 towns and cities, 20 million deaths, and much of its resources. Despite the magnitude of its losses, the U.S.S.R. was becoming increasingly threatening. National Security Council (NSC) documents declared, “The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world.” Secretary of State Dean Acheson “…developed the promising concept of negotiation from strength.” Consistent with that policy, Truman decided to proceed with the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Richard D Challener wrote that Truman would not have approved a 300 percent increase in the defense budget called for in NSC 68 if the Korean War hadn’t begun. The concept of nuclear deterrence became a key to defense strategy, but the U.S. had only nine atomic bombs in 1946. There were over fifty by the end of 1948. David Rosenberg wrote that Truman viewed the atomic bomb as a weapon of terror and a weapon of first resort. Despite that, he ordered vast increases in production facilities. On July 14, 1949 Truman told his top advisors, “Since we can’t obtain international control we must be the strongest in atomic weapons.” He approved a substantial increase in nuclear production in the fall of 1949 and an additional increase after the outbreak of the Korean War. Those approvals led, in part, to the construction of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant in Colorado. Continue reading