Category Archives: Saddam Hussein

Refugee Ethics

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A reader and frequent commenter sent me an article by Richard D. Lamm that appeared in the Denver Post. The story is told of Martin of Tours finding a starving beggar during a 13th Century ride and dividing his cloak and dinner with the desperate man. The question is asked “What if instead of one cold and starving beggar, there are 100?” Considering the world situation, what if there are thousands or millions? There is another report that ISIS has slaughtered another several hundred people after taking a city in Iraq, and thousands or hundreds of thousands of people are being displaced. I have difficulty imagining there is anyone remaining in Syria other than the various fighting organizations or a place for an “ordinary citizen” to live. Thousands of people are taking the perilous trip across the Mediterranean to escape the anarchy and terror of Libya (and perhaps wishing Gaddafi could return). Lamm mentions increasing population “…and political unrest in most of the Middle East and Africa guarantee continued massive migration from that volatile area. Is Europe’s only ethical response to take them all in?”

Lamm mentions that “…the U.S. has its own substantial pressure from south of its boarder (sic).” He then poses the ethical dilemma. “A moral response to an individual or manageable group might not make sense if there are hundreds of thousands. Sheer numbers can totally change the ethical implications.” “The maximum generosity of the developed world cannot absorb the staggering numbers fleeing political chaos, war, violence, and lack of economic opportunity.” Later in the article he writes, “No nation can be expected to commit social and cultural suicide. No ethics can demand what the ecosystem or social fabric of a society cannot support.”

I have fretted since the first reports of ISIS slaughters in Iraq that we as a nation should feel ashamed. Regardless of your beliefs about the justification of the second Iraq War, we did overthrow Saddam Hussein and established a fledgling democracy. We then decided we were “war weary” and withdrew our soldiers. The situation that evolved was predictable. There was an opportunity, perhaps a slim opportunity, to assist in establishing a stable and perhaps even prosperous country where people wouldn’t be slaughtered because they practiced the wrong religion. We instead chose to fulfill a political promise. Is there anyone out there who continues to believe withdrawing was the right thing to do? We also helped “decapitate” the dictatorship in Libya and then sat behind our comfortable borders while terrorists took over.

Perhaps we should be asking whether we’ve learned anything. Are we going to repeat what we did to Iraq in Afghanistan?   I understand the Taliban developed a motto after the announcements that we were going to withdraw on a schedule. “You have the watch and we have the time.”

Iraq after American Troops

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I’ve been reading about Iraq after American combat troops withdrew in December 2011.  The common criticism of the Iraq war was that it was “about nothing but oil,” and there is some interesting recent news about Iraq and oil. An article by Kay Johnson in the Associate Press titled “Again a power in OPEC, Iraq could shift landscape” reports that Iraq has been rapidly expanding oil production. The increase in oil being produced in Iraq is likely to complicate OPEC’s efforts to influence world prices.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki leads a Shiite-dominated coalition that has close ties with Iran, and Iraq is officially backing Iran’s push to set lower production limits to keep oil prices high. However, it is countermanding Iran’s desires by expanding oil production. “Iraq recently reached production of 3 million barrels per day, a level not seen since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein. It is on track to become OPEC’s second largest producer in the coming year, surpassing Iran and trailing only Saudi Arabia.”  It is estimated that Iraq could double production, which is the basis for the predictions of Iraq’s increasing influence on OPEC and the world.

What this means in Middle East and world politics is complicated. The increased economic clout available to Iraq from oil production (which provides 95 percent of government revenues) could result in economic prosperity and freedoms previously unimagined in that country. However, strife between the Sunnis and Shiites continues to be a problem. Shiite pilgrims trekking toward a shrine in Baghdad were recently attacked with car bombs. There were 93 people killed and 312 wounded according to an article from Mohammed Tawfeeq of CNN.  June 14 was the deadliest day in the country since the U.S. withdrew its troops.

I’ve posted several recent reviews and blogs about the Iraq war. The blog posting on June 13, 2012 has the comment, “…victory will not come from the service and sacrifice of the soldiers who fought in Iraq. That will happen, if it happens, within the culture of Islam. The soldiers have only functioned as the soil for the seed of freedom. The ultimate victory, if it is achieved must happen within Islam.”

Terrorism in Iraq is no longer justified by the presence of foreign soldiers. Now the people of Iraq have to decide whether indiscriminate killing of civilians based on how they worship is justified. I suggest they look at the genius of the American founders in insisting on allowing freedom of religion. I would speculate that any reasonable person would conclude that the “American experiment” resulted in a life style for citizens that the rest of the world envies. I see from afar that Iraq is at a crossroads, and I sincerely wish the best for them.

Blog Posting for Blood Stripes

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I began a review of this book with the comment “This is the best book I’ve read for some time.” It provides insight into the raw and uncensored emotions of men killing and being killed in the Iraq war. I believe this book should be required reading for Presidents who might need to request war powers from Congress and those in Congress who would have to vote on such an act. People making war policy should also be reminded how the U.S. encouraged Shiites to mutiny against Saddam Hussein in 1991, and that we did not give their mutiny any support. Thousands were tortured and killed. More than a decade later we invaded and the Shiites in some areas actually did celebrate the arrival of the Marines despite the earlier abandonment by U.S. politicians.

The need for the war in Iraq has been debated endlessly, and much of that debate was going on while our soldiers were killing and being killed. The Commander-In-Chief, the Marine commanders, and all the rest of us asked that combat soldiers go to war with “rules of engagement.” Combat soldiers are trained kill the enemy and not to be “peace keepers” or “nation builders.”  The General commanding the Marines told them, First do no harm. The second order was “No better friend, which referred to building a common cause with the people of Iraq. The third order was “No worse enemy.” The first two orders had nothing to do with Marine training. The last order finally arrived at what Marines are trained to do, “…if some bastard wants to fight, hunt him down and kill him (or her) before they do the same to you.” I think we somehow cobbled together things expected of the State Department and combat soldiers and expected young soldiers to figure it out. From what I read they somehow did an amazingly fine job.

kThe enemies of the Marines were fighting came from diverse backgrounds. They included religious fanatics, young single men, men with large families, mercenaries, and poor farmers who believed they were fighting to defend their village. One of them mentioned the movie Braveheart, and that portrayal of the fight for freedom.

For those who insist Iraq had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, Lebanese journalist Zaki Chehab was embedded with the insurgents. His chronicle, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, describes men claiming to be part of Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq which began opening terrorist training camps in Iraq “…shortly after the post-9/11 American attack into Afghanistan.” Zarqawi had originally fled to Iran and then to the Iraqi Kurdish mountains. He established a route through Iran to smuggle personnel and equipment from Afghanistan. “By the fall of 2002, the Al Qaeda Underground Railroad was running full steam—from Afghanistan, through Iran, and into a northern Iraqi hideout.”

We also sent soldiers to fight in a war that we only noticed on occasion when watching news clips of politicians arguing with each other about the war. The lives of average Americans who did not have someone close to them fighting in the heat, filth, and fear of the battlegrounds in Iraq were unaffected. The Marines acknowledged that they joined because they were promised the chance to kill legally, but were envious of the free and fun lives of the young people who hadn’t joined. One of them asked, “Don’t these people give a shit that we’re at war?”

I admit I worried about soldiers in the book who were described as “addicted to battle,” or those who felt satisfaction when they saw the “pink mist” created as their bullet passed through an enemy. However, we were the ones who put them there, and we must be thankful there are men such as these. George Orwell, the famous writer who did fight in combat in the Spanish Civil War, once wrote something to the effect that “People sleep soundly because there are rough men willing to do violence to protect them.” I would substitute “brave” for “rough.”

Marine grunts looked down on anyone who was not a Marine grunt. They called everyone outside that category Persons Other than Actual Grunts, or POAG. The acronym evolved into the word “pogue.” Everyone in the Marines not in combat units, everyone in the Navy, Army, and Air Force were pogues. Anyone who never wore a uniform was the worst kind of pogue. If I would have the honor of meeting one of the Marines portrayed in the book I would ask for my Army comrades who served in combat roles in Vietnam to be excluded from that description.

There was a Marine Chaplin who told the survivors that they would have to deal with the guilt for surviving while others did not. I understand that. A quote at the beginning of Chapter 15 is “Freedom isn’t free, but the U.S. military will pay your part of it.” The Marines who survived would deal not only with the guilt of surviving but also the loss of “…the purity of being surrounded by a group of men who, whether they loved or hated them, were devoted to giving their blood, seat, and lives for the same of their mission or their Corps.”

The book observes that victory will not come from the service and sacrifice of the soldiers who fought in Iraq. That will happen, if it happens, within the culture of Islam. The soldiers have only functioned as the soil for the seed of freedom. The ultimate victory, if it is achieved must happen within Islam.

One of the corporals was scheduled for a DUI trial, and the female judge opened the hearing by reading the award citation for his service in Iraq. The judge didn’t finish reading the entire citation, and later said she couldn’t finish because she realized she was being overcome with emotion. She simply ended the reading and announced, “Case Dismissed.” Reading that brought tears to my eyes.

“H-Money,” one of the interpreters for the battalion continued to carry a sniper rifle and “fought like a lion.” Fatima, another interpreter, made it to the U.S. and was working on becoming a citizen.”Muhammad remains alive and continues to fight Americans. Most expect this kind of war to go on for many, many years.”

Why George H. W. Bush Ended Operation Desert Shield in Iraq

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I recently posted a review of the book “Second Chance:  Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower” by Zbigniew Brzezinski in which he gives President George H. W. Bush a “solid B” for his foreign policy performance. However he said that Bush I’s greatest failure was stopping the Persian Gulf War,or “Operation Desert Shield,” before the last twenty divisions of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard were attacked and destroyed. As a result, the Guard was able to crush a Shiite rebellion that followed the withdrawal of collation forces, which allowed Hussein to remain in power. My recollection was that Bush ended the war because that was what was required by United Nations resolutions. I decided this was a subject worth researching, because the decision has had far-reaching foreign policy effects.

The first thing I found in researching the issue was a YouTube video of Bush announcing the end of the war to a joint session of Congress. Most of the over five minute video is of standing ovations by every member of Congress. The longest ovation was for Cheney and Powell for their role for planning and executing the war.

The Persian Gulf War Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives and Senate January 12, 1991 and authorized the use of U.S. military force against Iraq “pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.”  That resolution gave Hussein until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait. The UN would employ “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait after that date. In addition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the resolution specifically mentions the risks of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction. “Whereas, Iraq’s conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace…”  “Operation Desert Shield” was the name selected for the operation probably because of the intent to prevent Hussein from expanding his invasion into Saudi Arabia.

The war began on January 16 with heavy bombing and missile strikes. The land war began on February 23 after Iraq set massive fires in Kuwait’s oil fields. The war lasted a mere 100 hours with coalition forces easily and brutally rolling up the badly outmatched Iraq forces.

UN Resolution 686 states that the members would “…bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives…” Therefore, after Kuwait had been liberated and the Iraqi army was in full retreat, the UN stipulated that hostilities would end. Those were the orders given by Bush I.

An excellent report on the war and why Bush decided to end it when he did clearly states the war was ended in concert with the UN resolutions that were so crucial in arranging the delicate coalition of Arab and other countries to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush knew that the war had been approved by the UN to end to occupation of Kuwait, and any expansion would result in difficulties for the coalition and perhaps an even bigger war. There was also the question of swinging the balance of power from Iraq to Iran.

History has shown that the failure to take out the last divisions of Hussein’s Republican Guard has had a long lasting and obviously negative effect on the foreign policies of the United States. It is quite easy with the clarity of a rear view mirror to see what should have been done. However, I can’t help but wonder what skilled diplomats, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, would have done or what they would have counseled should have been done if they had been in the position of advising Bush I. Would they have advised ignoring the UN resolutions that had been so skillfully crafted and negotiated that led to the liberation of Kuwait, or would they have been more aggressive and “imperialist” and ordered coalition forces to crush remaining Iraq forces in violation of the UN resolutions. It doesn’t take too much imagination to picture what would have happened in Iraq if the Republican Guard and effectively the government of Iraq had been destroyed. The Shiite uprising would undoubtedly have created a civil war that would, I speculate, make the current instability in Iraq look mild. What would the United States have done then? Would Brzezinski have advised Bush he needed to establish control to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of Hussein?

My rear view mirror assessment of what Bush I did in Iraq was exactly what most diplomats would have recommended, and he would have been criticized even more strongly if he had ignored the intent of UN resolutions and taken out the Iraq government. Too bad things didn’t work out well after his decisions, but I predict things would have been worse absent his decisions.

Iraq and Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

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A review of the book “Atomic Obsession:  Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” by John Mueller was recently posted, and there were a few comments in that book  about Iraq’s  interest in chemical and nuclear weapons that, in my opinion, give an incomplete picture.

There is a comment that the Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 was ineffective. Wikipedia has extensive information about the reactor and the attack. The reactor was purchased from France in 1976 along with 72 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium. The purchase agreement stipulated that the reactor would not be used for military purposes, and French engineers said the reactor was “…unsuitable for making bombs.”

The Israelis were not the first to attack the facility. Iran had attacked and damaged the site with two bombers in 1980 shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Israeli officials had encouraged the Iranian attack. The Israelis attack involved eight bombers that flew through Saudi and Jordanian airspace in their attack speaking in Saudi Arabic and using Jordanian signals for cover. Eight of the sixteen bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. On the issue of whether the attack had disabled the reactor, the French originally agreed to aid in reconstruction, but withdrew from the project in 1984. The reactor “…remained in its damaged state until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was completely destroyed by coalition air strikes…”

Perhaps the reference to the ineffectiveness of the strike did not refer to the reactor that was damaged and not rebuilt. Saddam Hussein ordered “…a much larger underground program…” The reactor that was attacked was estimated to have been able to produce enough plutonium to construct one nuclear weapon per year and the new program was designed to make six bombs a year.

An article titled “Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein” by Michael R. Gordon published in the New York Times on October 25, 2011 provides some interesting information about Iraq and chemical and nuclear weapons. American forces captured extensive archives of discussions between Hussein and government officials during the 2003 invasion. One document quoted Hussein boasting “…that Iraq had a chemical weapons arsenal (during the Iraq-Iran war) that would ‘exterminate by the thousands’.” He also said “Once Iraq walks out victorious (over Iran) there will be no Israel.” He said of the Israeli attack on the reactor, “Technically, they are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq.”

On the subject of chemical weapons, there was a post titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction” dated December 31, 2010 that gives details of Saddam Hussein using chemical agents both in the war with Iran and against Kurds in his own country. According to a report on 60 Minutes Hussein admitted to his U.S. interrogator George L. Piro that he had feared he could not survive an inevitable attack from Iran “without the perception he had weapons of mass destruction. He told his generals that he would order the use of chemical weapons if Iraq was attacked, and he did that to hold Iran at bay. Saddam Hussein lied, and Bush and his advisors believed the lie.”

Osama bin Laden and the CIA

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I’ve posted  of a review in four parts on that link of this web site  about the excellent book, “The Looming Tower, al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11” by Lawrence Wright. The book describes how U.S. intelligence agencies failed to share information after they finally understood the risks presented by al Qaeda. That failure was created by government actions and decrees. According to an MSNBC report, Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick of the Clinton administration issued a memo in 1995 that gave detailed instructions to “…more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from…criminal investigations.” That memo resulted in what Attorney General Ashcroft later described as “…a snarled web of requirements, restrictions, and regulations… (that) prevented decisive action by our men and women in the field.” Ashcroft was testifying to the 9/11 Commission, and Jamie Gorelick, the author of the memo, was a member of that Commission. Ashcroft also told the Commission, “Government erected this wall. Government buttressed this wall. And before September 11, government was blinded by this wall.”

The CIA knew twenty months before 9/11 that there were at least two al Qaeda operatives in California and never told the FBI, perhaps because of the “wall” that had been built by the  Gorelick memo. Absent this artificial and strictly bureaucratic “wall” the CIA could have alerted the FBI that they knew al Qaeda members were in the United States and some were learning to fly planes. Absent the Gorelick memo, perhaps more attention would have been given to an e-mail from an FBI agent in Phoenix suggesting that Osama bin Laden was sending al Qaeda members to flight schools in Arizona. There also was a memo from FBI agents in Minneapolis focusing on activities of Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person indicted as part of the 9/11 conspiracy. Perhaps communication between the CIA and FBI, if it had been allowed by law and not been prohibited by the Gorelick memo, would have allowed agents from the two agencies to “connect the dots” and prevent al Qaeda from flying planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Regardless of what might have been if the agencies had been allowed to act responsibly
instead of according to government rules, Osama bin Laden died not knowing that he had succeeded at killing two CIA employees along with several others during the al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. He had said the embassy was targeted because it was a CIA station. Tom Shah and Molly Huckaby Hardy were working undercover for the CIA in the embassy. Tom Shah was the son of an Indian immigrant father and an American mother.  He had received his doctorate in music from Ball State in Indiana. He was fluent in several languages including Hindi, Arabic, and Russian. He joined the government under the cover of being a diplomat, but was immediately sent for training to become a spy. He had been dispatched to Kenya with the assignment to determine theauthenticity of a senior member of Saddam Hussein’s regime, who had said he wanted to defect. Tom walked to a window at the embassy when he heard shooting, and was killed by shredding glass when the bomb exploded.

Hardy was the other CIA agent killed by the bombing. She was a 51 year old divorced mom who had travelled to Asia, South America, and Africa. She handled finances, including handing out money used to pay sources. She was looking forward to a trip to meet a new grandchild when the bomb killed her.  She and Hardy were listed as State Department employees, but sources said they received private memorial services at CIA headquarters. Leon Panetta said after the death of bin Laden, “Throughout the effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, our fallen colleagues have been with us in memory and in spirit. With their strength and determination as our guide, we achieved a great victory three weeks ago.”