Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda

The front flap of John Mueller’s book begins with, “Ever since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the prospect of nuclear annihilation has haunted the modern world. And since September 11, 2001 the view that nuclear terrorism is the most serious threat to security of the United State or, for that matter, of the world has been virtually universal.” The author then goes to great lengths to say the risks have been exaggerated… Chapter 5 begins with “Although nuclear weapons seem to have had at most a quite limited substantive impact on actual historical evens…they had a tremendous influence on our agonies and obsessions.” The antinuclear movement is mentioned as an example of the agonies and obsessions.

The author says in the Preface he wanted the book to be a remedy for insomnia and that the purpose is to put to rest “…excessive anxiety about nuclear weapons.”  Many others have created anxiety with warnings about al Qaeda acquiring nuclear bombs and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. There were similar warnings about China, India, and Pakistan, but no calamity has yet resulted by those nations joining the “nuclear club.”

Part 1 is about the effects of nuclear weapons. “Beyond doubt, nuclear weapons are the most effective devices ever fabricated for killing vast numbers of people…” However, Part 2 discusses why nuclear weapons have had an exaggerated role in international politics. The author repeatedly mentions the enormous financial and resource costs in development of massive arsenals in the United States, the former Soviet Union, and other countries that would have been better spent on other ventures.

Risks from radiation that would be released by a “dirty bomb” are exaggerated because “…ghoulish copy sells.”  The greatest risk would be caused by the panic by people who have been inculcated that even traces of radioactive materials are deadly. About 20 percent of the general population will develop cancer, and people in the area where a “dirty bomb” is exploded will have a barely measurable increase in risk. Chernobyl raised the risk of thyroid cancer, but the risk of other cancers was increased by less than one percentage point with no increase in birth defects. (I expect some readers will object to this statement and many others from the book.)

There is interesting information postulating that the Soviets never wanted to see World War III; the memories of the horrors and massive losses of World War II told them another world war was to be avoided. “Indeed, three central rules for Soviet leaders were ‘avoid adventures, do not yield to provocation, and know when to stop’.” They did know when to stop during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev said there was not a single person among the Communist leaders who believed that the Soviets “…could defeat the United States, or that we were seriously preparing for a nuclear war with the United States. No one, as far as I know, had this absurd notion.” The United States demonstrated its manufacturing might to the Soviets during World War II by supplying them with hundreds of thousands of military vehicles, millions of boots, and “…over one-half pound of food for every Soviet soldier for every day of the war (much of it Spam).”

Some countries that had nuclear weapons decided to not keep them. South Africa dismantled theirs after deciding they were more trouble than they were worth. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan sent the weapons in their countries back to Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed. The Ukraine in particular wanted no part of nuclear weapons with the memories of Chernobyl. Libya terminated its nuclear weapons development program when it noticed the ease with which Iraqi military was defeated.  

I bogged down because of the redundancies in the book, but became reenergized by Chapter 10 titled “Costs of the Proliferation Fixation,” and Iraq takes center stage. Economic sanctions imposed against Iraq over many years did little to weaken Saddam Hussein. However they did result in “…hundreds of thousands of deaths in the country, most of them children under the age of five…” Madeleine Albright, the Ambassador to the United Nations, was asked on a 60 Minute show whether it was worth it to have a million children die as the result of sanctions. Albright did not dispute the number and answered, “We think the price is worth it.” She later said she regretted her answer. The comments “…went completely unremarked upon by the country’s media. Osama bin Laden did use the sanctions as a centerpiece of his diatribes against Americans. Several hundred thousand Iraqis would then die in the war that began in 2003 with the premise that an invasion was justified because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. (See the blog posting titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction?” for more information.)

The policy of punishing countries wanting to build nuclear weapons continues. Sanctions are in place against North Korea where millions of people are now underfed or starving. North Korea was called “the world’s first nuclear-armed, missile-wielding beggar.”  They have been able to “…hit the Pacific Ocean several times…” with their missiles. Their policy seems to be more extortion than aggression. Sanctions are increasing against Iran where citizens are also suffering.

Part III titled “The Atomic Terrorist” analyzes whether it is likely al Qaeda or some other terrorist group will be able to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The short answer is that it is quite unlikely. Terrorist wouldn’t be able to arm and use a stolen weapon because of all the safeguards all countries build into their weapons. It is also unlikely that a country would sell weapons to terrorists, since forensics after a blast would easily trace the weapon back to its source. No country would be willing to face the certain response to such an act.

The author gave me pause to be skeptical about the views presented in the book by writing that 85 foreign policy experts were polled on whether there would be a nuclear explosion in the world in the next ten years. They “…concluded on average that there was a 29 percent likelihood…” That doesn’t sound sufficiently unlikely to make me comfortable. The author disagrees. Referring back to his goal of curing insomnia by putting fears to rest, he closes the book by saying most states do not want nuclear weapons and they are out of reach of terrorists. “Sleep well.

There are positions taken by the author which disagree with other sources. He trivializes the effect of Soviet espionage against the U.S. during World War II. I’m guessing he never read about the results of the Venona project, which identified hundreds of Soviet agents in the U.S. government and military. Soviet agents were able to steal information and material that allowed the successful recreation of the Trinity nuclear device. He also writes that North Korea had to convince Stalin about their plans to invade the south. Other books report Stalin demanded the invasion as the North Koreans insisted their forces weren’t ready. All of this reinforces the thoughts of the brilliant person who said “History is interpretive.”

Iraq and Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

A review of the book “Atomic Obsession:  Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” by John Mueller was recently posted, and there were a few comments in that book  about Iraq’s  interest in chemical and nuclear weapons that, in my opinion, give an incomplete picture.

There is a comment that the Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 was ineffective. Wikipedia has extensive information about the reactor and the attack. The reactor was purchased from France in 1976 along with 72 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium. The purchase agreement stipulated that the reactor would not be used for military purposes, and French engineers said the reactor was “…unsuitable for making bombs.”

The Israelis were not the first to attack the facility. Iran had attacked and damaged the site with two bombers in 1980 shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Israeli officials had encouraged the Iranian attack. The Israelis attack involved eight bombers that flew through Saudi and Jordanian airspace in their attack speaking in Saudi Arabic and using Jordanian signals for cover. Eight of the sixteen bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. On the issue of whether the attack had disabled the reactor, the French originally agreed to aid in reconstruction, but withdrew from the project in 1984. The reactor “…remained in its damaged state until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was completely destroyed by coalition air strikes…”

Perhaps the reference to the ineffectiveness of the strike did not refer to the reactor that was damaged and not rebuilt. Saddam Hussein ordered “…a much larger underground program…” The reactor that was attacked was estimated to have been able to produce enough plutonium to construct one nuclear weapon per year and the new program was designed to make six bombs a year.

An article titled “Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein” by Michael R. Gordon published in the New York Times on October 25, 2011 provides some interesting information about Iraq and chemical and nuclear weapons. American forces captured extensive archives of discussions between Hussein and government officials during the 2003 invasion. One document quoted Hussein boasting “…that Iraq had a chemical weapons arsenal (during the Iraq-Iran war) that would ‘exterminate by the thousands’.” He also said “Once Iraq walks out victorious (over Iran) there will be no Israel.” He said of the Israeli attack on the reactor, “Technically, they are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq.”

On the subject of chemical weapons, there was a post titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction” dated December 31, 2010 that gives details of Saddam Hussein using chemical agents both in the war with Iran and against Kurds in his own country. According to a report on 60 Minutes Hussein admitted to his U.S. interrogator George L. Piro that he had feared he could not survive an inevitable attack from Iran “without the perception he had weapons of mass destruction. He told his generals that he would order the use of chemical weapons if Iraq was attacked, and he did that to hold Iran at bay. Saddam Hussein lied, and Bush and his advisors believed the lie.”

How to Break a Terrorist

The most important part of this book to me was the description of the origin of the conflict between Shia and Sunnis. It comes in a quoted passage of the author being questioned to determine his qualifications to be on an Iraqi terrorist interrogation team. When asked to explain the difference between Shia and Sunni, he replied, “That’s an easy one. It goes back to the schism in Islam caused by the death of Muhammad. Sunnis believe that the legitimate successor was Muhammad’s closest disciple, Abu Bakr. Shi believe the succession should have passed through his cousin Ali, who was also his daughter Fatima’s husband. The Shia lost, and Abu Bakr retained leadership until he died…and the Sunnis have held the balance of power ever since.” Sunnis held power under Saddam Hussein in the dominantly Shiite country of Iraq.

The book describes how an American interrogation team was searching for Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who established a terrorist organization called Tawhid al Jihad, and established strong ties with the Sunnis after Saddam was taken out of power. The book is listed as being authored by Matthew Alexander, but the author’s note states that it was written under a pseudonym and passages are blacked out, as by a censor.

The wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal changed everything in the interrogation techniques to “more civilized interrogation techniques.” The Foreword by Mark Bowden states that the question of limits to interrogation techniques “…had become predictably politically charged and highly controversial, with liberals viewing harsher tactics as a sign of more and legal degeneration, and conservatives regarding attitude toward coercion as a litmus test of one’s seriousness about the war on ‘terror’.” The “more civilized techniques” included getting to know the subject “…and then manipulating him by role-playing, flattering, misleading, and nudging his or her perception of truth slightly off center.” It seemed to me that “misleading” was the most important aspect, since lying to the prisoner was the most frequent part of the process. Continue reading

Drone Pilots

I became interested in this story after writing a previous blog about Pakistan and that country’s nuclear weapons. A 60 Minutes show in 2009 reported the United States was using drones, which the Air Force calls “unmanned aerial vehicles,” to attack insurgents and military targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  George W. Bush stirred national and international debate and criticism when he authorized drone strikes in Pakistan.  A Times Online report dated January 29, 2009 reported that multiple “suspected drones” killed at least 15 people in Pakistan.  They were “…the first strikes since Barack Obama became president and a clear sign that the controversial military policy begun by George W. Bush has not changed.”

Pakistan watched U.S. drones operate successfully for years and finally asked for the some of their own.  The U.S. denied the request, and  Pakistan began developing the technology. They are now reported to be working closely with Italian, Chinese, and Turkish firms, all of which use Israeli technology “borrowed” from American technology, on upgrades.There is a YouTube video titled “Pakistan Starts Manufacturing Drones,” but unfortunately I neither read nor understand Pakistani.

The drones are controlled from Creech Air Force Base 45 miles north of Las Vegas.  The drones are constantly on the hunt, and they are controlled by a pilot and crew member supported by a team of intelligence analysts.  There is a video that has been going around that shows a drone pilot and crew member controlling a drone, being given a target, acquiring the target (a white pickup truck), and blowing it up.

Watching it made me remember an Army officer giving a lecture to my Infantry Officer Candidate class.  He made what seemed to be an off-hand comment that made me think then and that I recall more than forty years later.  “The more impersonal war becomes, the more dangerous it becomes.”

Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction

President George W. Bush is quoted as saying in his January 2003 State of the Union Address that “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” CIA Director George Tenet said even though officials of his agency had concurred that the text was factually correct, those “16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President.” The controversy about whether “Bush lied” in exaggerating or inventing that Iraq had, or had planned to make, weapons of mass destruction consumed American politics and news reports for years.

Iraq did have a history of interest in development of nuclear weapons. A BBC report describes how an air attack by Israel destroyed a French-built nuclear reactor near Baghdad, “saying they believed it was designed to make nuclear weapons to destroy Israel.” The reactor “…was near completion but had not been stocked with nuclear fuel…” Iraq also had more than a theoretical interest in chemical weapons. A Department of Defense report details use of chemical agents numerous times against Iranian forces in the1980s and again in 1988 in attacks that killed thousands of Kurds in Hussein’s own country.

With that history it isn’t a surprise that President Bush and leaders of both political parties almost universally believed that Saddam Hussein probably had retained chemical agents and was willing to use them. But now we arrive at the really interesting part about who lied. There are numerous articles on the Internet about the interrogation of Saddam Hussein by George L. Piro, but I will focus on a “60 Minute” report.

It took five months of interrogation for Piro to gain the trust and respect of Hussein before he admitted why he had led the world to believe Iraq had chemical weapons while the United States was threatening invasion. Hussein admitted he miscalculated President Bush. He expected an air campaign that he could survive. He believed that Iraq’s major enemy was Iran, and that eventually there could be a security agreement with the United States that would prevent the Iranians from annexing southern Iraq. He also believed that he could not survive an inevitable attack from Iran “without the perception that he had weapons of mass destruction.” He told his generals that he would order the use of chemical weapons if Iraq was attacked, and he did that to hold Iran at bay. Saddam Hussein lied, and Bush and his advisors believed the lie.