This book presents Zbigniew Brzezinski’s analysis of the three presidential administrations preceding Barrack Obama. Those administrations represents the period after the United States had emerged as the victor of the Cold War and the “…three American presidents were not mere heads of state but the de facto leaders of the world.” Brzezinski was President Carter’s National Security Advisor. One reviewer of the book on Amazon refers to him as “…the finest foreign policy thinker of the past 100 years.” The review selected to present the less than complimentary side say the book presents “…few insights, but two extremely well-written chapters.” The assessments of the three presidents should not be a surprise to someone who has followed Brzezinski. He has been said to have been a prime source of President Obama’s anti-Iraqi war policy.
The author states that the “…emergence as the world’s most powerful state has saddled Washington’s leadership with three central missions…” A truncated version of those missions is: management of central power relationships, containment and termination of conflicts, and addressing inequalities in the human condition. “One superpower, fifteen years, three presidents: that in a nutshell is the focus of this book.”
George H. W. Bush came into office with an extensive background in foreign affairs, and was by far the most diplomatically skillful of the three presidents. He proved to be a superb crisis manager, but the author judges he ultimately failed as a strategic visionary. His greatest failure was not continuing the first Iraq War to remove Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. That allowed a Shiite rebellion to be crushed and Hussein to remain in power. He was said to have brilliantly and successfully dismantled the Soviet empire and cut down Hussein’s excessive ambitions, but exploited neither. (I have researched the UN resolutions that resulted in ending the Iraq War and dispute Mr. Brzezinski’s assessment as will be detailed in a blog posting.)
Bill Clinton had no experience and was focused almost exclusively on domestic affairs. He is described as “…the brightest and most futuristic, be he lacked strategic consistency…” His focus was globalization, although his critics called it “globaloney.” The foreign policy meetings held during his time in office were described as having little structure. It was said an observer would not have been able to guess that Clinton was the president and not just another person participating in the discussions. His effectiveness in all areas “…suffered from the president’s declining capacity to inspire and lead because of his personal difficulties…”
Clinton is especially criticized for his poor record of dealing with North Korea, India, and Pakistan in their development of nuclear weapons. Sanctions against Iran made it virtually impossible to have open relations with that country. Expansion of NATO and admission of China into the World Trade Organization are listed as Clinton successes. The Senate dealt Clinton and Gore a defeat when it voted 95 to 0 to oppose the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol is described as being the “whipping boy” for White House skeptics about the soundness of science in the global warming predictions.
The precipitous withdrawal of forces after the “Black Hawk Down” event encouraged those who believed the United States to be weak. However, the intense bombing campaign by NATO against Serbians sent a different message, as did the mistaken bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory. Clinton also approved bombing Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. His Middle East policy drifted from fair to lopsided in favor of Israel which resulted in worse Israeli-Palestinian relations than when he took office. He “…did not leave a historically grand imprint on the world.” His autobiography of over a thousand pages devotes only a few pages to foreign policy.
George W. Bush began with restrained foreign policy. He is described as having “…strong gut instincts but no knowledge of global complexities and a temperament prone to dogmatic formulations.” He dramatically changed from almost completely delegating foreign policy immediately after the 9/11 attacks. His advisors convinced him he was the “…commander in chief of ‘a nation at war’.” He was characterized as arrogant in his approach to foreign policy. The invasion of Iraq is described as his “original sin” that resulted in damage to the nation’s reputation throughout the Middle East and helped encourage the formation of al Qaeda. The author writes that “…the war has caused calamitous damage to America’s global standing…(and) has been a geopolitical disaster.” The actions have divided allies and united enemies. The fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found caused worldwide distrust. The author can’t help but contain his glee in one regard. “Perhaps the war’s only saving grace is that it made Iraq the cemetery of neocon dreams.”
The book provides a summary of world events leading up and during the fifteen years that is the focus. There are also thumbnail sketches of the key advisors to each of the three presidents. The author can’t resist making light of Ronald Reagan and the “fairy tale” of “an Evil Empire seeking global dominion.” He also disagrees strenuously that Reagan was the architect of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and mentions numerous other people who had, in his opinion, a larger role. The Solidarity movement in Poland led to upheavals in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev was seen as a key player because he allowed political dissent.
The thinking of the author and assessment of the three presidents is mostly focused on the differences between the globalization approach followed by Clinton and the neoconservative doctrine adopted by George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks. I’m confident that many so-called “neoconservatives,” including Charles Krauthammer, would disagree with the author’s declaration that “It was essentially an updated version of imperialism and was not primarily concerned with new global realities or novel social trends.” My recollection of the aftermath of 9/11 is radically different than that of the author. He writes that the fear of terrorism that was created “…began to verge on social intolerance, especially toward those whose ethnic origins or appearance could be viewed as giving grounds for suspicion.”
There is interesting information about the well-funded foreign policy lobbies.“The most active of these have been the Israeli-American and Cuban-American lobbies, both of which have the resources to make a difference in congressional fund-raising and command large electoral support in two major states, New York and Florida.”
The final chapter leads by describing “…Bush I was the policeman…Clinton was the social welfare advocate…(and) Bush II was the vigilante…” The “report card” gives Bush I a solid B, Clinton and uneven C, and Bush II a failed F. The author then predicts there will be a second chance if “…the next president (is) aware that the strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea…to the aspirations of politically awakened humanity.”