Part I of this blog discussed comments from a senior DOE official who read the book, “An Insider’s View of Rocky Flats” (which you can order at either CreateSpace.com or Amazon.com) about Soviet-funded international anti-nuclear organizations and changing public opinion about acceptable risk. I need to first address a response to the first post from the person who made the original comments. I skipped lightly over the issue of the lawsuits about hazardous waste laws, and thank goodness for people willing to set me straight! Here is a new comment about that issue. “DOE was not just being obstinate in fighting against coverage by these laws. The laws themselves specifically exempted DOE nuclear facilities…facilities like Rocky flats were directed to not comply…The wrinkle in the court case was in applying RCRA for the hazardous components of otherwise radioactive nuclear wastes, even if the hazardous component was very small compared to the radioactive component.”
Putting that issue aside, this posting is primarily about how Congress was influenced by the growing and vocal anti-nuclear movement to pass a new law that created massive impact on the ability of sites such as Rocky Flats to perform the duties assigned by Congress. As an occasional Libertarian I feel compelled to mention this is a classic example of how the government can create difficult and expensive problems by passing laws to satisfy a vocal part of their constituency. The information to follow is taken from the detailed comments of the DOE official who observed the problems first hand.
Congress passed the Price Anderson Reauthorization Act (PAAA) in 1988 in response to pressure from anti-nuclear protestors and concerns created by nuclear and industrial accidents. The reauthorization took away the blanket indemnification of contractors operating DOE facilities, and imposed legal conditions based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission practices for licensing commercial nuclear facilities. Contractors could only be indemnified only as long as they operated within a narrow “risk envelope.” The outcome was that the “expert based” approach to operations that had been employed successfully had to be replaced by strict procedural controls (as described in part in Chapter 11 of the book).
DOE oversight people were required to become adversarial policemen as contractors were being forced by the new law to replace knowledge-based operations with procedural controls. DOE headquarters reacted by bringing in large numbers of former Navy nuclear personnel, because it was seen that the Navy nuclear program was a successful model. “Sadly, many of these people did not understand nearly as much about operating facilities as those that hired them thought. Nuclear facilities with diverse operations are very different from naval reactors with very specific and limited operations. The cultural challenge (new oversight requirements, new managers that did not understand operations, and new oversight organizations that did not have a mission objective) was a perfect storm to affect the future of Rocky Flats operations.”
“It didn’t help Rocky Flats that Rockwell did not have a nuclear operations background, and was not corporately well equipped to deal with the new world” “The DOE staff likewise were not prepared for the new world. At Rocky Flats, the local DOE office had about 50 people; most involved in contract administration. To meet the new expectations, it suddenly had the workload of an organization several times larger. In addition, Washington HQ staff were not inclined to help the local office, and an adversarial relationship soon developed.”
The Soviets continued to be our enemy, court rulings put DOE sites out of compliance with waste management laws, and Congress passed a law that ended successful knowledge-based operations. Perhaps that explains why Rocky Flats was a difficult place to work.