Category Archives: War

The Good Soldiers

Posted on by

David Finkel wrote this book based on the eight months he was with the 2-26 Army Infantry Battalion that was ordered to Iraq as part of the “surge” announced by President George W. Bush in January 2007. The announcement set off a storm of criticism by people opposed to the war (I thought it should have been called “reinforcement”). Battalion commander Lt. Col. Ralph Kauzlarich was eager for his unit to deploy from Fort Riley, Kansas to Baghdad.

The book does not give a clear answer whether the surge was a success or failure, although the tone indicates the author certainly did not consider it a success. The book does provide brutal insight into the lives of combat infantry soldiers facing the daily possibility of being blown apart inside their Humvees by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Snipers were often waiting for them.

The first death was twenty-two year old Private First Class Jay Cajimat who died either instantly in an explosion or more slowly in the fire inside the Humvee that burned his arms and legs into stumps and the rest of him beyond recognition. The details of the deaths and treatment of the injured are difficult to read. As an example, a soldier treating a comrade with a head injury noted a piece of the injured man’s brain fell out as a bandage was being adjusted. The injuries aren’t always that obvious. The trauma suffered by those who watched fellow soldiers die will be with them for a lifetime. A friend of Kauzlarich had ominously warned him before he and his unit left Fort Riley, “You’re going to see a good man disintegrate before your eyes.”

The families, girl friends, wives, and children of the soldiers also suffered, and of course some suffered more than others. President Bush visited a soldier and his wife in Bethesda. The soldier was described as “ruined,” and was only able to do small movements with his eyes, fingers, and feet. The wife thanked Bush for coming, but wished she had told him he didn’t understand what they were going through and that he didn’t know how it felt. She began to cry, and Bush didn’t understand she was crying in anger.

Reality had been exposed even before the soldiers had left Fort Riley as they and their families completed forms prior to the deployment to select whether they wanted to be buried or cremated, the location of their cemetery, and what personal effects they wanted to have buried with them. The remainder of the country mostly was oblivious with the exception of watching news reports that were often about the opposing political views.

The author describes the soldiers leaving the Forward Operating Base (FOB) fully equipped for combat “…to make their first impression on 350,000 people who surely were just waiting to blow the dumbasses up.” They found an unexploded mortar shell with Iranian markings on the fins. “A lesson, perhaps, in who they would be fighting.”

Kauzlarich began the deployment believing that he and the men of his battalion were going to make a difference, and he was said to very frequently respond to questions or concerns with the comment, “It’s all good.” He also tended to make comments such as, “What’s the difference between ordinary and extraordinary? A little extra.” He had been influenced by studying the battle of Ia Drang in Vietnam, which was the subject of a book and movie called “We Were Soldiers Once…and Young.” He had been told by Hal Moore, the commander of the unit portrayed, to trust his instincts. He had almost daily opportunities to rely on his instincts and the skill and courage of his soldiers as they performed the missions intended to make Baghdad safe for Iraqis. He had great respect for Qasim, his counterpart in the Iraqi military, although the soldiers of the Iraqi unit would mostly desert in the face of intense combat. The explanation for those desertions is given in the descriptions of the torture and murder of Iraqis who had been suspected of helping the Americans.

Most of the soldiers would soon hate everything about Iraq. The hated the garbage along the roadsides that often was used to hide the IEDs and EFPs. They hated the open trenches of sewage, the smell, the heat, and their living conditions. Mostly they hated “…the way these people don’t care about freedom. I hate that human beings want to kill one another for nothing.” They didn’t understand why the Iraqis hated them as they risked their lives to make the country safe.

Not all felt that way. Bush said in a speech, “We’re helping the Iraqis take back their neighborhoods from the extremists…” Kauzlarich said, “I like this president.” Soldiers were beginning to refer to the “Lost Kauz,” and openly questioned how anyone could think they were winning. They began to openly admit to each other that they were hurting and scared.

General David Petraeus visited and acknowledged, “You never get used to the losses.” He went to Congress to present his report, and gave an optimistic outlook. He focused on the fact the number of combat deaths were declining. MoveOn.org bought a full page ad in The New York Times “…headlined GENERAL PETERAEUS OR GENERAL BETRAY US?”

Chapter 10 describes the soldiers from the battalion being treated for their devastating injuries at the Brooke Army Medical Center (BMAC) in the company of their wives or other family members. They had been told they hadn’t lost their arms, legs, or sight. “You gave your arm. You gave your leg. You gave your sight.” One of the soldiers had a specimen cup where he collected the pieces of metal and plastic shrapnel he had been pulling out of his wounds.

The soldiers had to attend a mandatory seminar on what to expect after they returned home. Many of them would have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All of them were told to expect flashbacks, to have trouble sleeping, and to be angry and jumpy. They were warned that some would have broken marriages and to find bank accounts cleaned out. None of them were expected to be unaffected. As they were preparing to return to the United States Senator Barrack Obama was telling General Petraeus, “I’m not suggesting that we yank all of our troops out of the way. I’m trying to get to an end point.”

I think the author sums up his feelings about whether the surge was worth it on the last page. He describes how Kauzlarich doesn’t open his eyes as he is departing in a helicopter. He thought to himself that they had won, “But he had seen enough.”

The Appendix lists the roster of soldiers in the battalion and has pictures of those Killed In Action.

Why George H. W. Bush Ended Operation Desert Shield in Iraq

Posted on by

I recently posted a review of the book “Second Chance:  Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower” by Zbigniew Brzezinski in which he gives President George H. W. Bush a “solid B” for his foreign policy performance. However he said that Bush I’s greatest failure was stopping the Persian Gulf War,or “Operation Desert Shield,” before the last twenty divisions of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard were attacked and destroyed. As a result, the Guard was able to crush a Shiite rebellion that followed the withdrawal of collation forces, which allowed Hussein to remain in power. My recollection was that Bush ended the war because that was what was required by United Nations resolutions. I decided this was a subject worth researching, because the decision has had far-reaching foreign policy effects.

The first thing I found in researching the issue was a YouTube video of Bush announcing the end of the war to a joint session of Congress. Most of the over five minute video is of standing ovations by every member of Congress. The longest ovation was for Cheney and Powell for their role for planning and executing the war.

The Persian Gulf War Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives and Senate January 12, 1991 and authorized the use of U.S. military force against Iraq “pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.”  That resolution gave Hussein until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait. The UN would employ “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait after that date. In addition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the resolution specifically mentions the risks of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction. “Whereas, Iraq’s conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace…”  “Operation Desert Shield” was the name selected for the operation probably because of the intent to prevent Hussein from expanding his invasion into Saudi Arabia.

The war began on January 16 with heavy bombing and missile strikes. The land war began on February 23 after Iraq set massive fires in Kuwait’s oil fields. The war lasted a mere 100 hours with coalition forces easily and brutally rolling up the badly outmatched Iraq forces.

UN Resolution 686 states that the members would “…bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives…” Therefore, after Kuwait had been liberated and the Iraqi army was in full retreat, the UN stipulated that hostilities would end. Those were the orders given by Bush I.

An excellent report on the war and why Bush decided to end it when he did clearly states the war was ended in concert with the UN resolutions that were so crucial in arranging the delicate coalition of Arab and other countries to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush knew that the war had been approved by the UN to end to occupation of Kuwait, and any expansion would result in difficulties for the coalition and perhaps an even bigger war. There was also the question of swinging the balance of power from Iraq to Iran.

History has shown that the failure to take out the last divisions of Hussein’s Republican Guard has had a long lasting and obviously negative effect on the foreign policies of the United States. It is quite easy with the clarity of a rear view mirror to see what should have been done. However, I can’t help but wonder what skilled diplomats, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, would have done or what they would have counseled should have been done if they had been in the position of advising Bush I. Would they have advised ignoring the UN resolutions that had been so skillfully crafted and negotiated that led to the liberation of Kuwait, or would they have been more aggressive and “imperialist” and ordered coalition forces to crush remaining Iraq forces in violation of the UN resolutions. It doesn’t take too much imagination to picture what would have happened in Iraq if the Republican Guard and effectively the government of Iraq had been destroyed. The Shiite uprising would undoubtedly have created a civil war that would, I speculate, make the current instability in Iraq look mild. What would the United States have done then? Would Brzezinski have advised Bush he needed to establish control to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of Hussein?

My rear view mirror assessment of what Bush I did in Iraq was exactly what most diplomats would have recommended, and he would have been criticized even more strongly if he had ignored the intent of UN resolutions and taken out the Iraq government. Too bad things didn’t work out well after his decisions, but I predict things would have been worse absent his decisions.

Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower

Posted on by

This book presents Zbigniew Brzezinski’s analysis of the three presidential administrations preceding Barrack Obama. Those administrations represents the period after the United States had emerged as the victor of the Cold War and the “…three American presidents were not mere heads of state but the de facto leaders of the world.” Brzezinski was President Carter’s National Security Advisor. One reviewer of the book on Amazon refers to him as “…the finest foreign policy thinker of the past 100 years.” The review selected to present the less than complimentary side say the book presents “…few insights, but two extremely well-written chapters.” The assessments of the three presidents should not be a surprise to someone who has followed Brzezinski. He has been said to have been a prime source of President Obama’s anti-Iraqi war policy.

The author states that the “…emergence as the world’s most powerful state has saddled Washington’s leadership with three central missions…” A truncated version of those missions is: management of central power relationships, containment and termination of conflicts, and addressing inequalities in the human condition. “One superpower, fifteen years, three presidents: that in a nutshell is the focus of this book.”

George H. W. Bush came into office with an extensive background in foreign affairs, and was by far the most diplomatically skillful of the three presidents. He proved to be a superb crisis manager, but the author judges he ultimately failed as a strategic visionary. His greatest failure was not continuing the first Iraq War to remove Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. That allowed a Shiite rebellion to be crushed and Hussein to remain in power. He was said to have brilliantly and successfully dismantled the Soviet empire and cut down Hussein’s excessive ambitions, but exploited neither. (I have researched the UN resolutions that resulted in ending the Iraq War and dispute Mr. Brzezinski’s assessment as will be detailed in a blog posting.)

Bill Clinton had no experience and was focused almost exclusively on domestic affairs. He is described as “…the brightest and most futuristic, be he lacked strategic consistency…” His focus was globalization, although his critics called it “globaloney.” The foreign policy meetings held during his time in office were described as having little structure. It was said an observer would not have been able to guess that Clinton was the president and not just another person participating in the discussions. His effectiveness in all areas “…suffered from the president’s declining capacity to inspire and lead because of his personal difficulties…”

Clinton is especially criticized for his poor record of dealing with North Korea, India, and Pakistan in their development of nuclear weapons. Sanctions against Iran made it virtually impossible to have open relations with that country. Expansion of NATO and admission of China into the World Trade Organization are listed as Clinton successes. The Senate dealt Clinton and Gore a defeat when it voted 95 to 0 to oppose the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol is described as being the “whipping boy” for White House skeptics about the soundness of science in the global warming predictions.

The precipitous withdrawal of forces after the “Black Hawk Down” event encouraged those who believed the United States to be weak. However, the intense bombing campaign by NATO against Serbians sent a different message, as did the mistaken bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory. Clinton also approved bombing Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. His Middle East policy drifted from fair to lopsided in favor of Israel which resulted in worse Israeli-Palestinian relations than when he took office. He “…did not leave a historically grand imprint on the world.” His autobiography of over a thousand pages devotes only a few pages to foreign policy.

George W. Bush began with restrained foreign policy. He is described as having “…strong gut instincts but no knowledge of global complexities and a temperament prone to dogmatic formulations.” He dramatically changed from almost completely delegating foreign policy immediately after the 9/11 attacks. His advisors convinced him he was the “…commander in chief of ‘a nation at war’.” He was characterized as arrogant in his approach to foreign policy. The invasion of Iraq is described as his “original sin” that resulted in damage to the nation’s reputation throughout the Middle East and helped encourage the formation of al Qaeda. The author writes that “…the war has caused calamitous damage to America’s global standing…(and) has been a geopolitical disaster.” The actions have divided allies and united  enemies. The fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found caused worldwide distrust. The author can’t help but contain his glee in one regard. “Perhaps the war’s only saving grace is that it made Iraq the cemetery of neocon dreams.”

The book provides a summary of world events leading up and during the fifteen years that is the focus. There are also thumbnail sketches of the key advisors to each of the three presidents. The author can’t resist making light of Ronald Reagan and the “fairy tale” of “an Evil Empire seeking global dominion.” He also disagrees strenuously that Reagan was the architect of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and mentions numerous other people who had, in his opinion, a larger role. The Solidarity movement in Poland led to upheavals in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev was seen as a key player because he allowed political dissent.

The thinking of the author and assessment of the three presidents is mostly focused on the differences between the globalization approach followed by Clinton and the neoconservative doctrine adopted by George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks. I’m confident that many so-called “neoconservatives,” including Charles Krauthammer, would disagree with the author’s declaration that “It was essentially an updated version of imperialism and was not primarily concerned with new global realities or novel social trends.” My recollection of the aftermath of 9/11 is radically different than that of the author. He writes that the fear of terrorism that was created “…began to verge on social intolerance, especially toward those whose ethnic origins or appearance could be viewed as giving grounds for suspicion.”

There is interesting information about the well-funded foreign policy lobbies.“The most active of these have been the Israeli-American and Cuban-American lobbies, both of which have the resources to make a difference in congressional fund-raising and command large electoral support in two major states, New York and Florida.”

The final chapter leads by describing “…Bush I was the policeman…Clinton was the social welfare advocate…(and) Bush II was the vigilante…” The “report card” gives Bush I a solid B, Clinton and uneven C, and Bush II a failed F. The author then predicts there will be a second chance if “…the next president (is) aware that the strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea…to the aspirations of politically awakened humanity.”

Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda

Posted on by

The front flap of John Mueller’s book begins with, “Ever since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the prospect of nuclear annihilation has haunted the modern world. And since September 11, 2001 the view that nuclear terrorism is the most serious threat to security of the United State or, for that matter, of the world has been virtually universal.” The author then goes to great lengths to say the risks have been exaggerated… Chapter 5 begins with “Although nuclear weapons seem to have had at most a quite limited substantive impact on actual historical evens…they had a tremendous influence on our agonies and obsessions.” The antinuclear movement is mentioned as an example of the agonies and obsessions.

The author says in the Preface he wanted the book to be a remedy for insomnia and that the purpose is to put to rest “…excessive anxiety about nuclear weapons.”  Many others have created anxiety with warnings about al Qaeda acquiring nuclear bombs and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. There were similar warnings about China, India, and Pakistan, but no calamity has yet resulted by those nations joining the “nuclear club.”

Part 1 is about the effects of nuclear weapons. “Beyond doubt, nuclear weapons are the most effective devices ever fabricated for killing vast numbers of people…” However, Part 2 discusses why nuclear weapons have had an exaggerated role in international politics. The author repeatedly mentions the enormous financial and resource costs in development of massive arsenals in the United States, the former Soviet Union, and other countries that would have been better spent on other ventures.

Risks from radiation that would be released by a “dirty bomb” are exaggerated because “…ghoulish copy sells.”  The greatest risk would be caused by the panic by people who have been inculcated that even traces of radioactive materials are deadly. About 20 percent of the general population will develop cancer, and people in the area where a “dirty bomb” is exploded will have a barely measurable increase in risk. Chernobyl raised the risk of thyroid cancer, but the risk of other cancers was increased by less than one percentage point with no increase in birth defects. (I expect some readers will object to this statement and many others from the book.)

There is interesting information postulating that the Soviets never wanted to see World War III; the memories of the horrors and massive losses of World War II told them another world war was to be avoided. “Indeed, three central rules for Soviet leaders were ‘avoid adventures, do not yield to provocation, and know when to stop’.” They did know when to stop during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev said there was not a single person among the Communist leaders who believed that the Soviets “…could defeat the United States, or that we were seriously preparing for a nuclear war with the United States. No one, as far as I know, had this absurd notion.” The United States demonstrated its manufacturing might to the Soviets during World War II by supplying them with hundreds of thousands of military vehicles, millions of boots, and “…over one-half pound of food for every Soviet soldier for every day of the war (much of it Spam).”

Some countries that had nuclear weapons decided to not keep them. South Africa dismantled theirs after deciding they were more trouble than they were worth. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan sent the weapons in their countries back to Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed. The Ukraine in particular wanted no part of nuclear weapons with the memories of Chernobyl. Libya terminated its nuclear weapons development program when it noticed the ease with which Iraqi military was defeated.  

I bogged down because of the redundancies in the book, but became reenergized by Chapter 10 titled “Costs of the Proliferation Fixation,” and Iraq takes center stage. Economic sanctions imposed against Iraq over many years did little to weaken Saddam Hussein. However they did result in “…hundreds of thousands of deaths in the country, most of them children under the age of five…” Madeleine Albright, the Ambassador to the United Nations, was asked on a 60 Minute show whether it was worth it to have a million children die as the result of sanctions. Albright did not dispute the number and answered, “We think the price is worth it.” She later said she regretted her answer. The comments “…went completely unremarked upon by the country’s media. Osama bin Laden did use the sanctions as a centerpiece of his diatribes against Americans. Several hundred thousand Iraqis would then die in the war that began in 2003 with the premise that an invasion was justified because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. (See the blog posting titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction?” for more information.)

The policy of punishing countries wanting to build nuclear weapons continues. Sanctions are in place against North Korea where millions of people are now underfed or starving. North Korea was called “the world’s first nuclear-armed, missile-wielding beggar.”  They have been able to “…hit the Pacific Ocean several times…” with their missiles. Their policy seems to be more extortion than aggression. Sanctions are increasing against Iran where citizens are also suffering.

Part III titled “The Atomic Terrorist” analyzes whether it is likely al Qaeda or some other terrorist group will be able to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The short answer is that it is quite unlikely. Terrorist wouldn’t be able to arm and use a stolen weapon because of all the safeguards all countries build into their weapons. It is also unlikely that a country would sell weapons to terrorists, since forensics after a blast would easily trace the weapon back to its source. No country would be willing to face the certain response to such an act.

The author gave me pause to be skeptical about the views presented in the book by writing that 85 foreign policy experts were polled on whether there would be a nuclear explosion in the world in the next ten years. They “…concluded on average that there was a 29 percent likelihood…” That doesn’t sound sufficiently unlikely to make me comfortable. The author disagrees. Referring back to his goal of curing insomnia by putting fears to rest, he closes the book by saying most states do not want nuclear weapons and they are out of reach of terrorists. “Sleep well.

There are positions taken by the author which disagree with other sources. He trivializes the effect of Soviet espionage against the U.S. during World War II. I’m guessing he never read about the results of the Venona project, which identified hundreds of Soviet agents in the U.S. government and military. Soviet agents were able to steal information and material that allowed the successful recreation of the Trinity nuclear device. He also writes that North Korea had to convince Stalin about their plans to invade the south. Other books report Stalin demanded the invasion as the North Koreans insisted their forces weren’t ready. All of this reinforces the thoughts of the brilliant person who said “History is interpretive.”

Iraq and Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

Posted on by

A review of the book “Atomic Obsession:  Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” by John Mueller was recently posted, and there were a few comments in that book  about Iraq’s  interest in chemical and nuclear weapons that, in my opinion, give an incomplete picture.

There is a comment that the Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 was ineffective. Wikipedia has extensive information about the reactor and the attack. The reactor was purchased from France in 1976 along with 72 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium. The purchase agreement stipulated that the reactor would not be used for military purposes, and French engineers said the reactor was “…unsuitable for making bombs.”

The Israelis were not the first to attack the facility. Iran had attacked and damaged the site with two bombers in 1980 shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Israeli officials had encouraged the Iranian attack. The Israelis attack involved eight bombers that flew through Saudi and Jordanian airspace in their attack speaking in Saudi Arabic and using Jordanian signals for cover. Eight of the sixteen bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. On the issue of whether the attack had disabled the reactor, the French originally agreed to aid in reconstruction, but withdrew from the project in 1984. The reactor “…remained in its damaged state until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was completely destroyed by coalition air strikes…”

Perhaps the reference to the ineffectiveness of the strike did not refer to the reactor that was damaged and not rebuilt. Saddam Hussein ordered “…a much larger underground program…” The reactor that was attacked was estimated to have been able to produce enough plutonium to construct one nuclear weapon per year and the new program was designed to make six bombs a year.

An article titled “Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein” by Michael R. Gordon published in the New York Times on October 25, 2011 provides some interesting information about Iraq and chemical and nuclear weapons. American forces captured extensive archives of discussions between Hussein and government officials during the 2003 invasion. One document quoted Hussein boasting “…that Iraq had a chemical weapons arsenal (during the Iraq-Iran war) that would ‘exterminate by the thousands’.” He also said “Once Iraq walks out victorious (over Iran) there will be no Israel.” He said of the Israeli attack on the reactor, “Technically, they are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq.”

On the subject of chemical weapons, there was a post titled “Which President Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction” dated December 31, 2010 that gives details of Saddam Hussein using chemical agents both in the war with Iran and against Kurds in his own country. According to a report on 60 Minutes Hussein admitted to his U.S. interrogator George L. Piro that he had feared he could not survive an inevitable attack from Iran “without the perception he had weapons of mass destruction. He told his generals that he would order the use of chemical weapons if Iraq was attacked, and he did that to hold Iran at bay. Saddam Hussein lied, and Bush and his advisors believed the lie.”

Military Reunion in San Antonio

Posted on by

Thirty one graduates from  the U.S. Army Infantry Officers Candidate School (OCC) who were commissioned Second Lieutenants on March 9, 1967 gathered in San Antonio to remember those who did not survive Vietnam and those who have passed since. I was assigned to the third platoon under the command of Tactical (TAC) Lt. Paul R. Longgrear.

A small but dedicated group of the former candidates had located or learned the fate of most of our fellow graduates and organized the first reunion in Washington, D.C. That reunion included a visit to the Vietnam Memorial where the names of our fallen comrades are included among the 58,272 total (as of 2010).

I resisted participating in the reunions, because the overall OCS experience was unpleasant (proving my command for understatement). The physical requirements were intense and demanding, and I struggled to keep up with those who physically were dominantly like football halfbacks and were agile and could run fast while I was the lumbering lineman.

My wife finally convinced me we should attend a reunion at Fort Benning to take part in the dedication of a plaque with the names of those from our company who were Killed in Action (KIA). She was right; I felt better after we attended the reunion and renewed acquaintances.

We also attended a wonderful reunion in Southwest Colorado in 2011, and I wrote a posting about that gathering. To remind us that we are all approaching the end of our lives, the man who hosted the gathering died of a heart attack a couple of weeks later.

That brings me back to San Antonio and the 45th anniversary of our commissioning. We didn’t arrive until after the visit with Wounded Warriors at the Brooke Army Medical Center. Those who did make that visit were still emotional about what they had seen as they talked to us. They were especially grateful to those who provide the private funds to the Center.

The first event my wife and I were able to attend after a social gathering was one of our comrades reading the letter written by William Barrett Travis pledging that the Alamo would be defended to the last man. The names of our comrades who were killed in combat and those who have passed were then read.

The same gentleman seemed to more enjoy playing the guitar and singing a song of remembrance and a song of faith. That was followed by several of us going on a several mile drive in what I think was a giant circle, parking, and going on a two mile hike along the River Walk. Someone mentioned it reminded them of a forced march with the Rangers during our OCS training. We finally found a restaurant we later learned was about three blocks from the El Tropicana Hotel where we started. Map reading to find a destination is apparently a skill that doesn’t last. (Several of us promised to hardly ever mention the hike.)

The next rainy and chilly day we went on another hike that was advertised as “a few blocks” that turned into several. We walked past the Korean Memorial, the Vietnam Memorial, and the Confederate Memorial on the way to Alamo. The Vietnam Memorial is a very large sculpture of a radio man kneeling beside a man who was probably his mortally wounded company commander. We then toured the Alamo and read the names of the volunteers who died there to give the other Texans the time to organize and prepare to defeat Santa Anna.

We had a wonderful sit down dinner at the hotel that evening, and one of our friends arrived at the table sniffing and wiping his eyes. “What’s wrong?” “Allergies.” But he then broke down and began to sob. He had gone to thank Major Graham White for his service, and was called “Sir.” He said, “I wouldn’t even be able to lift his jacket with all those medals, and he called me Sir!”

Major White (the son of one of our comrades) was in dress blues and jump boots, and he gave the keynote speech for the evening. His resume includes multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and he has a long list of commendations including two Purple Hearts and two Bronze Stars. He talked about his Army comrades who had suffered injuries that would have devastated average people, but returned to service after lengthy and intensive rehabilitation. The theme was “Army Strong,” and “This is your Army!” George Orwell wrote something to the effect, “People sleep peacefully in their beds because there are rough men willing to do violence for them.” I would substitute “tough and brave” for “rough,” but Orwell had it mostly right.

There was instruction on how to do a “Texas line dance.” There were some willing to participate and many others of us willing to watch.

I’ll end this by briefly mentioning a speech by Paul Longgrear. He was at Lang Vei, where the North Vietnamese used tanks with devastating effects that caused extensive casualties. I will refer to a review of the book “Night of the Silver Stars” that recounts details of the battle.