Blog Posting for Blood Stripes

I began a review of this book with the comment “This is the best book I’ve read for some time.” It provides insight into the raw and uncensored emotions of men killing and being killed in the Iraq war. I believe this book should be required reading for Presidents who might need to request war powers from Congress and those in Congress who would have to vote on such an act. People making war policy should also be reminded how the U.S. encouraged Shiites to mutiny against Saddam Hussein in 1991, and that we did not give their mutiny any support. Thousands were tortured and killed. More than a decade later we invaded and the Shiites in some areas actually did celebrate the arrival of the Marines despite the earlier abandonment by U.S. politicians.

The need for the war in Iraq has been debated endlessly, and much of that debate was going on while our soldiers were killing and being killed. The Commander-In-Chief, the Marine commanders, and all the rest of us asked that combat soldiers go to war with “rules of engagement.” Combat soldiers are trained kill the enemy and not to be “peace keepers” or “nation builders.”  The General commanding the Marines told them, First do no harm. The second order was “No better friend, which referred to building a common cause with the people of Iraq. The third order was “No worse enemy.” The first two orders had nothing to do with Marine training. The last order finally arrived at what Marines are trained to do, “…if some bastard wants to fight, hunt him down and kill him (or her) before they do the same to you.” I think we somehow cobbled together things expected of the State Department and combat soldiers and expected young soldiers to figure it out. From what I read they somehow did an amazingly fine job.

kThe enemies of the Marines were fighting came from diverse backgrounds. They included religious fanatics, young single men, men with large families, mercenaries, and poor farmers who believed they were fighting to defend their village. One of them mentioned the movie Braveheart, and that portrayal of the fight for freedom.

For those who insist Iraq had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, Lebanese journalist Zaki Chehab was embedded with the insurgents. His chronicle, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, describes men claiming to be part of Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq which began opening terrorist training camps in Iraq “…shortly after the post-9/11 American attack into Afghanistan.” Zarqawi had originally fled to Iran and then to the Iraqi Kurdish mountains. He established a route through Iran to smuggle personnel and equipment from Afghanistan. “By the fall of 2002, the Al Qaeda Underground Railroad was running full steam—from Afghanistan, through Iran, and into a northern Iraqi hideout.”

We also sent soldiers to fight in a war that we only noticed on occasion when watching news clips of politicians arguing with each other about the war. The lives of average Americans who did not have someone close to them fighting in the heat, filth, and fear of the battlegrounds in Iraq were unaffected. The Marines acknowledged that they joined because they were promised the chance to kill legally, but were envious of the free and fun lives of the young people who hadn’t joined. One of them asked, “Don’t these people give a shit that we’re at war?”

I admit I worried about soldiers in the book who were described as “addicted to battle,” or those who felt satisfaction when they saw the “pink mist” created as their bullet passed through an enemy. However, we were the ones who put them there, and we must be thankful there are men such as these. George Orwell, the famous writer who did fight in combat in the Spanish Civil War, once wrote something to the effect that “People sleep soundly because there are rough men willing to do violence to protect them.” I would substitute “brave” for “rough.”

Marine grunts looked down on anyone who was not a Marine grunt. They called everyone outside that category Persons Other than Actual Grunts, or POAG. The acronym evolved into the word “pogue.” Everyone in the Marines not in combat units, everyone in the Navy, Army, and Air Force were pogues. Anyone who never wore a uniform was the worst kind of pogue. If I would have the honor of meeting one of the Marines portrayed in the book I would ask for my Army comrades who served in combat roles in Vietnam to be excluded from that description.

There was a Marine Chaplin who told the survivors that they would have to deal with the guilt for surviving while others did not. I understand that. A quote at the beginning of Chapter 15 is “Freedom isn’t free, but the U.S. military will pay your part of it.” The Marines who survived would deal not only with the guilt of surviving but also the loss of “…the purity of being surrounded by a group of men who, whether they loved or hated them, were devoted to giving their blood, seat, and lives for the same of their mission or their Corps.”

The book observes that victory will not come from the service and sacrifice of the soldiers who fought in Iraq. That will happen, if it happens, within the culture of Islam. The soldiers have only functioned as the soil for the seed of freedom. The ultimate victory, if it is achieved must happen within Islam.

One of the corporals was scheduled for a DUI trial, and the female judge opened the hearing by reading the award citation for his service in Iraq. The judge didn’t finish reading the entire citation, and later said she couldn’t finish because she realized she was being overcome with emotion. She simply ended the reading and announced, “Case Dismissed.” Reading that brought tears to my eyes.

“H-Money,” one of the interpreters for the battalion continued to carry a sniper rifle and “fought like a lion.” Fatima, another interpreter, made it to the U.S. and was working on becoming a citizen.”Muhammad remains alive and continues to fight Americans. Most expect this kind of war to go on for many, many years.”

Ending the Iraq War: A Primer

I previously reviewed the book “The Good Soldiers” by David Finkel about an infantry battalion that was part of the surge, and that led me to read a book that gives the anti-Iraq war perspective. This book by Phyllis Bennis certainly fits that description. There are quotes from a report by the National institute for Strategic Studies describing the war as creating “…an incubator for terrorism.” I may have chosen poorly, since the book has not had a single review posted on Amazon.

I attempt in my reviews to let authors tell their side of the story without editorial comment and then post disagreements in a posting on the blog link. There were sections that gave me difficulty complying with that approach. The book does contain interesting information about the history of Iraq and its ethnic diversity.

I thought using “frequently asked questions” to introduce discussion was a good approach. One question was, “Didn’t the ‘surge’ strategy work?” General Petraeus’s reported that the surge was working. The author disagreed, writing that the reduction in violence in Iraq came from the unilaterally declared ceasefire by Moqtada al-Sadar and his Mahdi Army militia and also because of payments given to Sunni militias in exchange for them not targeting US and UK occupation troops. Violence spiked in 2008 when Prime Minister Maliki ordered an attack on Sadr’s militia in Basra. Large numbers of Iraqi soldiers and police defected to Sadr. Iran arranged a ceasefire between the two Shi’a forces.

Many of the conflicts are between the Sunnis and Shi’a (most books use the term Shiite) militias. Sunnis Arabs make up 15-20 percent of the population and were disproportionally privileged in wealth and power in Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party. Shi’as are 55-60 percent of the population. The Kurds are primarily Sunnis.The Kurds have been protected by the US and are the most supportive of US policy. (There are an estimated 30 million Kurds in the world, and they are often named as the largest ethnic group without a state of their own.) Some have tried to make people think of themselves as Iraqis instead of Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurd, but with little success. One fact that is not in dispute is that there are fewer Iraqis in the country because of the war. An estimated two million Iraqis fled mostly to Jordan and Syria.

The borders of Middle East countries were established by “…the French-British trading schemes…” Faisal was appointed by the British to be king in 1921, and his son and grandson succeeded him. Faisal II was overthrown in a revolution against the monarchy in 1958. The Ba’athist government was officially secular but dominated by Sunnis. The book mentions that the CIA “…helped orchestrate the coup…” Saddam Hussein took control in 1968.

There are criticisms of several U.S. politicians to include Henry Kissinger, who developed and funded a plan for Iraqi Kurds to launch an uprising against Baghdad to weaken Iraq in its war against Iran. The Kurds were abandoned and were overrun by the Iraqi military after the war. Kissinger was said to have commented “…covert work should not be confused with missionary work.” President Clinton is criticized for claiming the U.S. was required by the UN to enforce the “no fly zone.” No UN resolution mentions creation or enforcement of such zones. All politicians arguing whether Iraq should be divided in three parts or united are said to be “…rooted in a set of thoroughly colonial assumptions about who has the ‘right’ to impose their will on Iraq and Iraqis from outside.”

The book frequently mentions “lie after lie” by the Bush administration in advocating the start of the war. Specifics include weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons programs, uranium yellowcake in Niger, Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, and Iraqi involvement in 9/11. There is a question whether U.S. actions brought a constitution to Iraq. There was a constitution adopted in 2005, but it was drafted mostly by U.S. lawyers under contract to the State Department.

The question “What war crimes have been committed in Iraq?” begins with bombing civilian targets and a long list of other actions designated as war crimes during the Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The twelve years of economic sanctions that followed were said to have resulted in the death of half a million Iraqi children. Secretary of State Madeline Albright infamously replied to a question about the children, “We think the price is worth it.” The invasion of Iraq is characterized “…as what the Nuremberg principles identify as the worst war crime: a crime against peace in the form of a war of aggression.” The “…congressional authorization passed in November 2002 granting Bush permission to go to war…” did not make the invasion legal.

Part II of the book presents the Bush administration’s arguments for the war and, in the opinion of the author, dispels them. The war is said to have increased recruitment of terrorists instead of making us safer. Iraq had carefully controlled borders before the war, but the U.S. demobilized the border guards. “Iraq has been transformed into a gathering place…for global terrorists…” The author says the real reasons the U.S. wanted a war were, “…oil, power, and ideology.” There are lengthy discussions that oil was main objective. There is a sarcastic comment in a couple of places that Americans seem to think the invading troops would be welcomed “…with sweets and flowers and singing in the streets.”

Part III discusses global effects of the Iraq war. The brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was ruthlessly secular and not a safe place for fundamentalist Islamic terrorists. Iraq now “…is global center stage for a concentrated host of terrorist forces.” The war has “…accelerated recruitment for al-Qaeda.”

There is an interesting discussion of how many Shi’a sought refuge in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and many of those have now returned to Iraq. Iran was one of the first countries in the region to recognize the government of Maliki, and one of the few to maintain full diplomatic relations. The other powerful Iraqi Shi’a, al-Sadr, spends much of his time in Iran “…burnishing his religious credentials…”

Part IV is about ending the war, and I don’t intend to spend much time with that since U.S. combat troops were withdrawn in December 2011 after the book was published. The author directs strong criticism toward the U.S. Congress which “…essentially abdicated its constitutional responsibility to declare or reject war in 2002 when it gave the Bush administration the power to decide whether to go to war against Iraq. Congress could have ended the war at any time by refusing to vote supplemental war funding bills out of committee.

See the posting on the blog link for an update about current events in Iraq.

Iraq after the War

I’ve been reading and reviewing books about the Iraqi war, and believe the primary question is, “Was it worth it?” There is an excellent article in Spiegel Online International by Bernhard Zand that is summarized in the title, “Obama’s Over-Hasty Withdrawal, Iraq is Neither Sovereign, Stable, nor Self-Reliant. The article begins with a description of a meeting between some students with Ahmed Chalabi, the man the U.S. brought in from exile after the Iraqi government had been dismantled by the invasion to be prime minister and oil minister. He had a goal to rebuild Iraq. The businessman was asked whether Iraq was what he would imagined it would become. He replied,”We have all failed. Totally”

The article was written in late March 2012 as the Arab League was preparing to meet in Baghdad. It was to be the first meeting of the League in Iraq since 1990, the first since the beginning of the “Arab Spring,” and the first since the last U.S. combat soldier left on December 18, 2011. President Obama had given a speech saying the U.S. was “…leaving a sovereign, stable and self-reliant country with a representative government elected by the people.” The article says, “…the circumstances of the US withdrawal and the language Obama used to whitewash it borders on negligence.”

Devoted Shiite Nouri Al-Maliki was imposed as Prime Minister of Iraq because he was perceived to have the best chance to form a government in the short term. He issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice President the day after he came to power, drove other Sunnis out, and strengthened relations with Iran.  He also has appointed figureheads and relatives to important government positions who have access to lucrative government contracts.  Many areas of the country continue to lack basic services, and over 4,000 Iraqis had died in violence after the exit of the Americans to the date of the article. There continues to be a risk that the country will splinter. Western Sunni regions could secede if Syria falls to Sunni rule, Kurdish areas are effectively autonomous, and other areas have either threatened or announced plans to separate.

A New York Times article by Michael S. Schmidt published about a month after the U.S. troop withdrawal expressed concern that violence had increased. One speculation is that Al Qaeda in Iraq has regained strength and has “…shifted its attention toward those with close ties to Iran, particularly Iraq’s Shiites, in an effort to push back Iran’s influence in Iraq in the wake of the American withdrawal.”

A multipage Bloomberg Business week article by Elliot Woods has the ominous title “Iraq:  Under Worse Management,” and describes a country in shambles. There is inadequate infrastructure to deliver water and electricity or to remove sewage and garbage. Corruption is routine. Iraq is far from stable, and the future is uncertain, but there is some good news. “By some statistical measures, Iraq today is safer and more stable than it has been in nearly a decade.” There are “…shouts of young men watching soccer in the cafes, the laughter of children tromping off to school.” I’m hoping the blood shed by American soldiers has the ultimate outcome that Iraqis decide to stand against terrorists.

One encouraging sign is that a Google search for “Iraq in June 2012” brought up sites for job openings in Iraq, a cycling event that includes Iraq, a soccer game with Jordan, and an upcoming trade show. That must mean the world media has lost interest in violence in Iraq, and the media is notoriously disinterested when there aren’t disasters to report. I remain hopeful for the Iraqi people. However, there continue to be politicians who have not put aside the tradition of corruption, hatred for those with different religions, and desire for absolute power.

I’m typing this on Memorial Day, and am thinking of the American soldiers who gave lives and limbs in Iraq. Their mission was to make Iraq a safe place for its citizens. To Iraqis, you have been given a precious opportunity bought with the service and blood of soldiers. I don’t expect you to think kindly of people many or most of you resented being in your country. All I ask is that you don’t waste what they gave for you.

I’ll close this by revealing I was apparently one of the few Americans who thought the war was a bad idea from the start. However, I will never criticize soldiers who fought or are fighting to fulfill a mission given them by their commander.

The Good Soldiers

David Finkel wrote this book based on the eight months he was with the 2-26 Army Infantry Battalion that was ordered to Iraq as part of the “surge” announced by President George W. Bush in January 2007. The announcement set off a storm of criticism by people opposed to the war (I thought it should have been called “reinforcement”). Battalion commander Lt. Col. Ralph Kauzlarich was eager for his unit to deploy from Fort Riley, Kansas to Baghdad.

The book does not give a clear answer whether the surge was a success or failure, although the tone indicates the author certainly did not consider it a success. The book does provide brutal insight into the lives of combat infantry soldiers facing the daily possibility of being blown apart inside their Humvees by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Snipers were often waiting for them.

The first death was twenty-two year old Private First Class Jay Cajimat who died either instantly in an explosion or more slowly in the fire inside the Humvee that burned his arms and legs into stumps and the rest of him beyond recognition. The details of the deaths and treatment of the injured are difficult to read. As an example, a soldier treating a comrade with a head injury noted a piece of the injured man’s brain fell out as a bandage was being adjusted. The injuries aren’t always that obvious. The trauma suffered by those who watched fellow soldiers die will be with them for a lifetime. A friend of Kauzlarich had ominously warned him before he and his unit left Fort Riley, “You’re going to see a good man disintegrate before your eyes.”

The families, girl friends, wives, and children of the soldiers also suffered, and of course some suffered more than others. President Bush visited a soldier and his wife in Bethesda. The soldier was described as “ruined,” and was only able to do small movements with his eyes, fingers, and feet. The wife thanked Bush for coming, but wished she had told him he didn’t understand what they were going through and that he didn’t know how it felt. She began to cry, and Bush didn’t understand she was crying in anger.

Reality had been exposed even before the soldiers had left Fort Riley as they and their families completed forms prior to the deployment to select whether they wanted to be buried or cremated, the location of their cemetery, and what personal effects they wanted to have buried with them. The remainder of the country mostly was oblivious with the exception of watching news reports that were often about the opposing political views.

The author describes the soldiers leaving the Forward Operating Base (FOB) fully equipped for combat “…to make their first impression on 350,000 people who surely were just waiting to blow the dumbasses up.” They found an unexploded mortar shell with Iranian markings on the fins. “A lesson, perhaps, in who they would be fighting.”

Kauzlarich began the deployment believing that he and the men of his battalion were going to make a difference, and he was said to very frequently respond to questions or concerns with the comment, “It’s all good.” He also tended to make comments such as, “What’s the difference between ordinary and extraordinary? A little extra.” He had been influenced by studying the battle of Ia Drang in Vietnam, which was the subject of a book and movie called “We Were Soldiers Once…and Young.” He had been told by Hal Moore, the commander of the unit portrayed, to trust his instincts. He had almost daily opportunities to rely on his instincts and the skill and courage of his soldiers as they performed the missions intended to make Baghdad safe for Iraqis. He had great respect for Qasim, his counterpart in the Iraqi military, although the soldiers of the Iraqi unit would mostly desert in the face of intense combat. The explanation for those desertions is given in the descriptions of the torture and murder of Iraqis who had been suspected of helping the Americans.

Most of the soldiers would soon hate everything about Iraq. The hated the garbage along the roadsides that often was used to hide the IEDs and EFPs. They hated the open trenches of sewage, the smell, the heat, and their living conditions. Mostly they hated “…the way these people don’t care about freedom. I hate that human beings want to kill one another for nothing.” They didn’t understand why the Iraqis hated them as they risked their lives to make the country safe.

Not all felt that way. Bush said in a speech, “We’re helping the Iraqis take back their neighborhoods from the extremists…” Kauzlarich said, “I like this president.” Soldiers were beginning to refer to the “Lost Kauz,” and openly questioned how anyone could think they were winning. They began to openly admit to each other that they were hurting and scared.

General David Petraeus visited and acknowledged, “You never get used to the losses.” He went to Congress to present his report, and gave an optimistic outlook. He focused on the fact the number of combat deaths were declining. MoveOn.org bought a full page ad in The New York Times “…headlined GENERAL PETERAEUS OR GENERAL BETRAY US?”

Chapter 10 describes the soldiers from the battalion being treated for their devastating injuries at the Brooke Army Medical Center (BMAC) in the company of their wives or other family members. They had been told they hadn’t lost their arms, legs, or sight. “You gave your arm. You gave your leg. You gave your sight.” One of the soldiers had a specimen cup where he collected the pieces of metal and plastic shrapnel he had been pulling out of his wounds.

The soldiers had to attend a mandatory seminar on what to expect after they returned home. Many of them would have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All of them were told to expect flashbacks, to have trouble sleeping, and to be angry and jumpy. They were warned that some would have broken marriages and to find bank accounts cleaned out. None of them were expected to be unaffected. As they were preparing to return to the United States Senator Barrack Obama was telling General Petraeus, “I’m not suggesting that we yank all of our troops out of the way. I’m trying to get to an end point.”

I think the author sums up his feelings about whether the surge was worth it on the last page. He describes how Kauzlarich doesn’t open his eyes as he is departing in a helicopter. He thought to himself that they had won, “But he had seen enough.”

The Appendix lists the roster of soldiers in the battalion and has pictures of those Killed In Action.

Why George H. W. Bush Ended Operation Desert Shield in Iraq

I recently posted a review of the book “Second Chance:  Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower” by Zbigniew Brzezinski in which he gives President George H. W. Bush a “solid B” for his foreign policy performance. However he said that Bush I’s greatest failure was stopping the Persian Gulf War,or “Operation Desert Shield,” before the last twenty divisions of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard were attacked and destroyed. As a result, the Guard was able to crush a Shiite rebellion that followed the withdrawal of collation forces, which allowed Hussein to remain in power. My recollection was that Bush ended the war because that was what was required by United Nations resolutions. I decided this was a subject worth researching, because the decision has had far-reaching foreign policy effects.

The first thing I found in researching the issue was a YouTube video of Bush announcing the end of the war to a joint session of Congress. Most of the over five minute video is of standing ovations by every member of Congress. The longest ovation was for Cheney and Powell for their role for planning and executing the war.

The Persian Gulf War Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives and Senate January 12, 1991 and authorized the use of U.S. military force against Iraq “pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.”  That resolution gave Hussein until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait. The UN would employ “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait after that date. In addition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the resolution specifically mentions the risks of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction. “Whereas, Iraq’s conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace…”  “Operation Desert Shield” was the name selected for the operation probably because of the intent to prevent Hussein from expanding his invasion into Saudi Arabia.

The war began on January 16 with heavy bombing and missile strikes. The land war began on February 23 after Iraq set massive fires in Kuwait’s oil fields. The war lasted a mere 100 hours with coalition forces easily and brutally rolling up the badly outmatched Iraq forces.

UN Resolution 686 states that the members would “…bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives…” Therefore, after Kuwait had been liberated and the Iraqi army was in full retreat, the UN stipulated that hostilities would end. Those were the orders given by Bush I.

An excellent report on the war and why Bush decided to end it when he did clearly states the war was ended in concert with the UN resolutions that were so crucial in arranging the delicate coalition of Arab and other countries to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush knew that the war had been approved by the UN to end to occupation of Kuwait, and any expansion would result in difficulties for the coalition and perhaps an even bigger war. There was also the question of swinging the balance of power from Iraq to Iran.

History has shown that the failure to take out the last divisions of Hussein’s Republican Guard has had a long lasting and obviously negative effect on the foreign policies of the United States. It is quite easy with the clarity of a rear view mirror to see what should have been done. However, I can’t help but wonder what skilled diplomats, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, would have done or what they would have counseled should have been done if they had been in the position of advising Bush I. Would they have advised ignoring the UN resolutions that had been so skillfully crafted and negotiated that led to the liberation of Kuwait, or would they have been more aggressive and “imperialist” and ordered coalition forces to crush remaining Iraq forces in violation of the UN resolutions. It doesn’t take too much imagination to picture what would have happened in Iraq if the Republican Guard and effectively the government of Iraq had been destroyed. The Shiite uprising would undoubtedly have created a civil war that would, I speculate, make the current instability in Iraq look mild. What would the United States have done then? Would Brzezinski have advised Bush he needed to establish control to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of Hussein?

My rear view mirror assessment of what Bush I did in Iraq was exactly what most diplomats would have recommended, and he would have been criticized even more strongly if he had ignored the intent of UN resolutions and taken out the Iraq government. Too bad things didn’t work out well after his decisions, but I predict things would have been worse absent his decisions.

Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower

This book presents Zbigniew Brzezinski’s analysis of the three presidential administrations preceding Barrack Obama. Those administrations represents the period after the United States had emerged as the victor of the Cold War and the “…three American presidents were not mere heads of state but the de facto leaders of the world.” Brzezinski was President Carter’s National Security Advisor. One reviewer of the book on Amazon refers to him as “…the finest foreign policy thinker of the past 100 years.” The review selected to present the less than complimentary side say the book presents “…few insights, but two extremely well-written chapters.” The assessments of the three presidents should not be a surprise to someone who has followed Brzezinski. He has been said to have been a prime source of President Obama’s anti-Iraqi war policy.

The author states that the “…emergence as the world’s most powerful state has saddled Washington’s leadership with three central missions…” A truncated version of those missions is: management of central power relationships, containment and termination of conflicts, and addressing inequalities in the human condition. “One superpower, fifteen years, three presidents: that in a nutshell is the focus of this book.”

George H. W. Bush came into office with an extensive background in foreign affairs, and was by far the most diplomatically skillful of the three presidents. He proved to be a superb crisis manager, but the author judges he ultimately failed as a strategic visionary. His greatest failure was not continuing the first Iraq War to remove Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. That allowed a Shiite rebellion to be crushed and Hussein to remain in power. He was said to have brilliantly and successfully dismantled the Soviet empire and cut down Hussein’s excessive ambitions, but exploited neither. (I have researched the UN resolutions that resulted in ending the Iraq War and dispute Mr. Brzezinski’s assessment as will be detailed in a blog posting.)

Bill Clinton had no experience and was focused almost exclusively on domestic affairs. He is described as “…the brightest and most futuristic, be he lacked strategic consistency…” His focus was globalization, although his critics called it “globaloney.” The foreign policy meetings held during his time in office were described as having little structure. It was said an observer would not have been able to guess that Clinton was the president and not just another person participating in the discussions. His effectiveness in all areas “…suffered from the president’s declining capacity to inspire and lead because of his personal difficulties…”

Clinton is especially criticized for his poor record of dealing with North Korea, India, and Pakistan in their development of nuclear weapons. Sanctions against Iran made it virtually impossible to have open relations with that country. Expansion of NATO and admission of China into the World Trade Organization are listed as Clinton successes. The Senate dealt Clinton and Gore a defeat when it voted 95 to 0 to oppose the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol is described as being the “whipping boy” for White House skeptics about the soundness of science in the global warming predictions.

The precipitous withdrawal of forces after the “Black Hawk Down” event encouraged those who believed the United States to be weak. However, the intense bombing campaign by NATO against Serbians sent a different message, as did the mistaken bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory. Clinton also approved bombing Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. His Middle East policy drifted from fair to lopsided in favor of Israel which resulted in worse Israeli-Palestinian relations than when he took office. He “…did not leave a historically grand imprint on the world.” His autobiography of over a thousand pages devotes only a few pages to foreign policy.

George W. Bush began with restrained foreign policy. He is described as having “…strong gut instincts but no knowledge of global complexities and a temperament prone to dogmatic formulations.” He dramatically changed from almost completely delegating foreign policy immediately after the 9/11 attacks. His advisors convinced him he was the “…commander in chief of ‘a nation at war’.” He was characterized as arrogant in his approach to foreign policy. The invasion of Iraq is described as his “original sin” that resulted in damage to the nation’s reputation throughout the Middle East and helped encourage the formation of al Qaeda. The author writes that “…the war has caused calamitous damage to America’s global standing…(and) has been a geopolitical disaster.” The actions have divided allies and united  enemies. The fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found caused worldwide distrust. The author can’t help but contain his glee in one regard. “Perhaps the war’s only saving grace is that it made Iraq the cemetery of neocon dreams.”

The book provides a summary of world events leading up and during the fifteen years that is the focus. There are also thumbnail sketches of the key advisors to each of the three presidents. The author can’t resist making light of Ronald Reagan and the “fairy tale” of “an Evil Empire seeking global dominion.” He also disagrees strenuously that Reagan was the architect of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and mentions numerous other people who had, in his opinion, a larger role. The Solidarity movement in Poland led to upheavals in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev was seen as a key player because he allowed political dissent.

The thinking of the author and assessment of the three presidents is mostly focused on the differences between the globalization approach followed by Clinton and the neoconservative doctrine adopted by George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks. I’m confident that many so-called “neoconservatives,” including Charles Krauthammer, would disagree with the author’s declaration that “It was essentially an updated version of imperialism and was not primarily concerned with new global realities or novel social trends.” My recollection of the aftermath of 9/11 is radically different than that of the author. He writes that the fear of terrorism that was created “…began to verge on social intolerance, especially toward those whose ethnic origins or appearance could be viewed as giving grounds for suspicion.”

There is interesting information about the well-funded foreign policy lobbies.“The most active of these have been the Israeli-American and Cuban-American lobbies, both of which have the resources to make a difference in congressional fund-raising and command large electoral support in two major states, New York and Florida.”

The final chapter leads by describing “…Bush I was the policeman…Clinton was the social welfare advocate…(and) Bush II was the vigilante…” The “report card” gives Bush I a solid B, Clinton and uneven C, and Bush II a failed F. The author then predicts there will be a second chance if “…the next president (is) aware that the strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea…to the aspirations of politically awakened humanity.”